Siman 209

One who transfers to his fellow an item that is not defined: if its type was known, even though its measure and weight are not known, he has acquired it; but if its type is not known, he has not acquired it. How so? "This pile of wheat I am selling to you for such and such," "this cellar of wine I am selling to you for such and such," "this sack of figs I am selling to you for such and such"—even though the measure of the pile is not known, nor the number of jars, nor the weight of the figs, behold, his sale is established. This is so even if it is found to be less or more than the estimation that was in their minds, and they have the law of ona'ah according to the market rate, even if the rate of that item was not known to them [Shach], for certainly their intention was not that the purchase be established even when they are defrauded; rather, each one estimated in his mind that there is such and such in the pile, and therefore we judge ona'ah in this. And this is similar to the fixing of a purchase price that was explained in siman 200, section 15, for the estimation is their fixing. And even according to the one who maintains in siman 227 that in a bulk sale (akhsara) there is no ona'ah, he admits here; for there, the buyer sees that the total and the measure are hidden from the seller as well, whereas here, the buyer imagines that the seller knows the measure and did not resolve in his heart to buy it without ona'ah. Therefore, even if the seller did not know its measure, since the buyer did not know of his lack of knowledge, there is ona'ah [as appears to me to resolve what the Sma wrote there in subsection 34]. And although there is one who says that whoever maintains there is no ona'ah in a bulk sale maintains so here as well, that there is no ona'ah [Taz ibid.], nevertheless, the primary view appears to be as we explained, that here all agree there is ona'ah. And as for that which was explained in Yoreh Deah siman 175 regarding one who goes to milk his goats and says to him, "Whatever my goats milk is sold to you for such and such," that it is not ribbit even if it was a lot—and why do we not say there that there should be ona'ah in this like here? It can be said that there, since everyone sees that it is a matter hidden from the eye, they certainly resolved in their minds to buy it however it may be [it appears to me]. Furthermore, there it only deals with the law of ribbit when they wish to uphold the matter, and it does not deal at all with the law of ona'ah, for in any case, this is a thing that has not yet come into the world [Netivot HaMishpat]. Furthermore, since he advanced him money, they certainly considered and accepted however much it would be [ibid.]. And regarding the law, it is implied from the poskim that the law of ona'ah does not apply there.

But one who says to his fellow, "Everything that is in this house I am selling to you for such and such," or "Everything that is in this chest" or "in this sack I am selling to you for such and such," and the buyer agreed and performed meshikhah, there is no kinyan here, for the buyer's mind was not resolved, as he does not know what is in it, whether straw or gold. This is nothing other than like one who plays with dice, which is a way of jest and mockery, and so too anything similar to this. And even according to what was written in siman 207, section 25, that playing with dice is a kinyan, that is because the matter was hidden from both of them and they resolved and transferred ownership to one another; which is not the case here, where the seller knows and the buyer does not know. Therefore, if it is revealed to the buyer that what is here was also hidden from the seller, he has acquired [as is apparent from the Sma]. And some say that here, in any case, it is not a kinyan, for their minds were not resolved at all and they acted only in a way of jest and mockery, and it is not similar to dice, for such is the way of dice but not in buying and selling [as is apparent from the Taz and the Shach]. Therefore, it appears to me that if they performed a kinyan in a prominent beit din, according to everyone it is a kinyan. And so too, if he said to him, "Everything that is in this house I am selling to you according to how appraisers shall appraise it," or that the sale shall be according to how they sell in the city, it is a kinyan and he has acquired. And some say that the same law applies to two people who exchanged everything they have, that there is no kinyan in this, like one who said "Everything that is in this house I am selling to you," as was written in siman 203, section 9. And in siman 241 it will be explained that regarding a gift, one also does not acquire a thing that is not defined; see there.

One who sells wheat to his fellow for ten dinars and did not specify how much he sold him, he gives him according to the market rate that existed at the time of the sale. And anyone who retracts after the giving of the money and did not want according to the market rate at the time of the giving of the money, he receives a "mi she-para." And if he specified with him before the rate was established, even if the seller has wheat, he does not receive a "mi she-para" because he can say, "I relied on the fact that you would buy elsewhere," unless the buyer said to the seller, "Behold, I am relying on you," or he showed himself before him at the threshing floor, for then he certainly relied on him; therefore, if he retracts, he receives a "mi she-para" [Taz].

Two people who exchanged their property and obligated themselves to a fine for charity should they not fulfill the exchange, and afterwards they forgave one another for the exchange and each remained with his own property, they are exempt from the fine. For even though the law of asmachta does not apply to charity, as was written at the end of siman 207, nevertheless, since it is in their power to fulfill the exchange and be exempt from the fine, for this reason it is also in their power to say, "Behold, it is as if we exchanged." But if one insulted his fellow and the beit din fined the insulter to give him such and such, and the insulted party said, "Behold, I am giving this to charity," he does not have the power to forgive the insulter, for immediately upon saying that he is giving them to charity, his hand was removed from this, as was written in Yoreh Deah siman 258 [Sma].

Sometimes there is a matter that is not defined even by a known type, such as a ship full of wheat that has sunk and is still submerged in the water, and one sold it to another for such-and-such an amount based on the uncertainty; for it is possible that all the wheat was washed away and swept into the water, and it is possible that not all of it was washed away, and it is possible that the bottom portion was not spoiled at all. It is possible that this is similar to a game of dice, since it is hidden from the eyes of all, and they resolved in their hearts to effect the kinyan with a complete heart. And similarly regarding a mound of salt that was burnt, for many times the bottom salt remains intact, and he sold them based on the uncertainty for such-and-such an amount; and since it is hidden from the eyes of all, it is possible that it is similar to a game of dice and they resolve and transfer ownership to one another, and it requires further study for the law. And one who sells his portion of his house or his portion of his field before division, even though his portion is not yet clarified, nevertheless it is not called a matter that is not defined, for behold, the house or the field is defined [Ba'er Heitev in the name of the Rashba, manuscript].

A person cannot transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world, for the acquisition has nothing upon which to take effect, whether in a sale or in a gift. And even in the gift of a shekhiv mera, whose words are considered as if written and delivered and do not require a kinyan, nevertheless it is not effective for something that has not yet come into the world. For the sages only instituted regarding a shekhiv mera that in a case where a kinyan would be effective for a healthy person, the shekhiv mera transfers ownership through words alone; but regarding something for which a kinyan is not effective, the words of a shekhiv mera are no better than the kinyan of a healthy person, as I wrote in siman 250. Therefore, if he said, "Whatever this field produces is sold to you," or "Whatever this tree produces is sold to you," and he performed a kinyan, it is nothing. Similarly, if he said, "Whatever this animal or this maidservant gives birth to is sold to you," and he performed a kinyan, it is nothing. Even if the animal or the maidservant was pregnant, it is nothing, for a fetus is like that which is not in the world; and even if the fetus was recognizable, it is like that which has not come into the world [Tur siman 210]. And as for that which we establish in Kiddushin, that if one betrothed a fetus and its fetus was recognizable she is betrothed, as written in Even HaEzer siman 40, this is because of the stringency of a married woman; we are concerned that perhaps once the fetus is recognizable it is like that which has come into the world, for so wrote the Rambam, of blessed memory, in the Commentary on the Mishnah, chapter 3 of Kiddushin. But according to the essential law, it is like that which has not come into the world [and the difficulty of the Chelkat Mechokek there is answered]. And in truth, if another came and betrothed her after she gave birth, she requires a get from both of them [it appears to me]. Therefore, also regarding hekdesh, when one consecrated a fetus after its fetus was recognizable, the hekdesh takes effect because of the stringency of the prohibition, even though a person cannot consecrate with monetary sanctity something that has not yet come into the world [Bava Batra 79b]; for this is like the betrothal of a woman, and if one committed me'ilah with it, he does not bring a sacrifice for me'ilah, for they only concerned themselves for stringency [it appears to me, and many difficulties of the Ketzot HaChoshen are settled, and delve into this]. And it appears to me that if he sold the animal to one person and the fetus to another when its fetus was recognizable, the sale to both of them stands according to all opinions; and even according to the opinion in siman 203 that it is not effective to transfer something that has not yet come into the world along with something that has come into the world, nevertheless, since they are one body and the fetus was recognizable, it is effective according to all opinions [and it is answered from Shabbat 135b]. And there is one who says that specifically when he sold it to him for "when it shall give birth," it is something that has not yet come into the world; but if he sold him the fetus immediately, such that even if it dies the fetus shall be his, it is something that has come into the world, for this is like one who transferred to him one of the limbs of the animal [Netivot HaMishpat].

And even though regarding a fetus we said that even once its pregnancy is recognized it is considered a thing that has not yet come into the world, however, regarding a tree and grain, once they have reached the stage of budding, he can sell the fruit and the grain, and it is called having come into the world. And it is not similar to a fetus which is covered within the body of the animal, whereas the budding is revealed to all and all the fruits grow from the budding. Furthermore, in the case of budding, it is obvious that he can sell the budding itself, whereas regarding a fetus, even the part of it that is currently present he cannot sell [Ketzot HaChoshen].

When one sells a thing that has not yet come into the world, the seller or the buyer may retract even after it has come into the world—for example, if the cow gave birth or the fruits grew—since the sale is as if it were nothing. Nevertheless, if the buyer preceded and seized the fruits before the seller retracted, we do not remove them from him. Even when the seller did not know of this law that a person cannot transfer a thing that has not yet come into the world, and it is possible that had he known he would have retracted, such that the seizure is in error—and it is no worse than a waiver in error which is not a waiver—nevertheless, since he seized it, he has seized it, for in such a case it is a waiver [Rashi, Bava Metzia 66b], as we are witnesses that it is pleasing to the seller to be a man of his word, and even if he had known he could retract, he would not have retracted [Tosafot ibid.]. This is specifically when the seller knew that he seized it [Rosh], for if not so, it would be a waiver without knowledge, which is like despair without knowledge that does not effect acquisition [Ketzot HaChoshen], unlike the one who disagrees on this [and see what I wrote in siman 66, section 40, and in Shulchan Aruch section 17, and in Shach there]. Certainly, when the seller knew the law of a thing that has not yet come into the world and knew of his seizure and remained silent and did not protest against him, his intention is surely to uphold the sale; and although the first kinyan is not a kinyan, the seizure is a complete kinyan. When he says after he seized it that he retracts, he is not believed, for had he retracted, he would not have allowed him to seize it, or immediately upon becoming aware of his seizure, he would have protested against him [it appears to me]. The same applies to other things that had not yet come into the world: when he sold them, and after they came into the world, before the retraction of the seller, the buyer seized them or took possession of them and he did not protest against him, he has acquired them and we do not remove them from his hand. Even if he did not seize them but the seller wrote him a shtar and delivered it to him, it is as one who seized the purchase; this is specifically if he delivered the shtar to him after the thing came into the world [Sma]. Although there are those who disagree on this, nevertheless, such is the primary ruling [Netivot HaMishpat]. It appears to me that regarding movables, a shtar is not effective, but a shtar of obligation wherein he obligated himself to sell him this thing is effective. Likewise, if the seller gave him a mashkon after the purchase came into the world, and the mashkon is for the fulfillment of the purchase, it is like seizure; and even though a mashkon is not a kinyan, nevertheless it is at least a seizure. There is one who disagrees with this, and so wrote our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in siman 60, see there. There is one who wishes to say that seizure is not effective when the previous kinyan was with kinyan sudar because the sudar returns to its owner, but it does not appear so to me, for since it is by reason of waiver so that he may remain a man of his word, he acquires now through his seizure or his taking possession, and certainly if the seller knew the law of a thing that has not yet come into the world, it becomes now a complete kinyan.

Some say that all this applies when he transfers it to him without specification, but if he said to him that he should acquire it when it comes into the world, he has acquired it even though it is not currently in the world. There are those who disagree, and such is the primary ruling [Taz and the Gra]. It appears to me that when he transferred it to him with a kinyan of money for land, and gave the money to the seller, and said to the buyer: "You shall acquire the land when it comes into my possession" or "the produce when it grows," he has acquired it when it grows and when it comes into his possession, for we consider the money as a deposit until the time it comes into the world, and afterwards he acquires with this money [as it appears to me from Kiddushin 20a; and that which they rejected of the first opinion in siman 210 is well-settled].

If one sold a tree for its fruit, or a maidservant or an animal for their offspring—for example, if he said, "acquire this tree for its fruit," meaning that the fruit shall be yours, or "acquire this cow for its offspring"—even though he did not sell him the tree or the cow themselves, it is considered like a thing that has come into the world and he acquires it immediately, and neither of them can retract. For when one sells the fruit or the offspring, the kinyan has nothing upon which to take effect; but when one says, "acquire the tree for its fruit," the kinyan takes effect on the tree, and he acquires the tree immediately, and when it produces fruit, they have grown from his tree. And even though the tree is not his, nevertheless regarding the fruit it is as his, and he acquired the body of the object temporarily for the sake of the fruit, and the kinyan took effect on the body for the sake of the fruit. However, one who says to his fellow that he should acquire from him the value of the wine when he sells the wine—and even if he said, "acquire the wine for the money that will come from it"—he does not acquire it. It is not similar to a tree for its fruit or an animal for its offspring, for the fruit and the offspring emerge from the body of the tree and the animal, but the money does not emerge from the body of the wine [Alshech siman 7]. And some say that he does acquire it, for since he transfers the body of the object and the kinyan has something upon which to take effect, even though he does not transfer to him that which emerges from this body but rather that which will be by means of this, it is a kinyan [Mishneh LaMelech chapter 23]. And the early authorities also disagreed on this [see Tosafot Gittin 66a]. And a house for the value of dwelling, he certainly acquires it, for it is always in existence and stands for dwelling [see there 42b, s.v. eved].

Even though a person cannot transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world, nevertheless, he can obligate himself for something that has not yet come into the world, for he is obligating his person to a certain matter, and his person is in the world, as written in siman 60. And if he can subject something that has not yet come into the world to a creditor as a lien, there is a dispute regarding this, and it was explained there that by the enactment of the sages, so as not to lock the door before borrowers, the lien takes effect. It was also explained there in section 12 that this ability to obligate himself for something that has not yet come into the world applies to something within his power to obtain; but regarding that which is not within his power at all, such as obligating himself for the object of another, and the other is not a shopkeeper and is not prone to sell his objects, the obligation does not take effect. See what I wrote in siman 211, section 8. And one who transfers ownership to his fellow of something that has not yet come into the world along with something that has come into the world in a single kinyan, some say it is similar to "acquire you and the animal," which will be explained in siman 210, and we have already explained this in siman 203, section 8; see there.

If one vowed or swore to fulfill the sale of a thing that has not yet come into the world, he is obligated to fulfill his oath; even though the kinyan does not take effect, nevertheless, the vow and the oath take effect upon him. And they do not descend to his properties, but rather they compel him to fulfill his vow and his oath [Taz]. And if he died, his heirs are not obligated to fulfill the kinyan. And so too if he requested absolution for his vow or his oath; and even though regarding a matter that concerns the benefit of his fellow one does not request absolution without the knowledge of his fellow, nevertheless, post facto it is permitted, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 228; and see what I wrote at the end of siman 207.

With a condition, one may also stipulate regarding a thing that has not yet come into the world, and regarding a thing that is not in his power, and regarding a thing that has no substance. For example, one who sells land to his fellow and stipulates with him "on condition that you give me such and such from its fruits every year," or "on condition that you give me the object of Reuven," for a condition does not pertain to the essence of the sale, but rather the fulfillment of the purchase is dependent upon this. Similarly, a person can remove himself and his power from a thing that has not yet come into the world. For example, if one had liened to him properties that he will acquire and he has not yet acquired them, he can remove himself even with the language of "I have no claim or suit regarding the properties you will acquire." Similarly, one who betrothed a woman and wishes to remove himself so that he shall not eat of her fruits after the marriage, he shall say to her: "I have no claim or suit regarding your fruits," as is written in Even HaEzer siman 92. And why does this language work? Since he has not yet merited it. But when he has already merited it, the language of removal is not effective, as is written in siman 37 and siman 149. And specifically when he has a connection to these properties is removal effective, such as one who has a lien on the properties or one who betrothed a woman. But if he has no connection at all yet, such as if he has no lien at all on his fellow, the language of removal is not effective, just as the language of removal from fruits before betrothal is not effective, as is written there; for from what thing is he removing himself, since he has no connection? And even the language of mechilah is not effective in this, for mechilah is only effective when the thing has come into the world and is in his possession, such as if he borrowed from him and his properties became liened and he waives his debt, or he waives his lien from this field. But a thing that is not in his possession at all and the matter has not yet come into the world—for example, if he has not yet borrowed from him, or if Reuven says to Shimon, "Behold, I waive to you all gifts that you will give me until a year from today"—it is not effective. And if Shimon gave him a gift afterwards with a kinyan, Reuven's prior mechilah is not effective, for just as a person cannot transfer a thing that has not yet come into the world, so too he cannot waive a thing that has not yet come into the world [Sma subsection 21]. And some say that the language of removal is effective even when it has not yet been liened, and only the language of mechilah is not effective [Taz]. And the main point is according to the first opinion [Netivot HaMishpat]. Therefore, Reuven who removed himself from the objects of Shimon so that he should not collect them when Shimon borrows from him, the removal is not effective; and if he afterwards borrowed from him, he can collect them, for removal when he has no connection at all is not effective, and also the language of mechilah is not effective in this. And so ruled the Maharit regarding a woman who deposited movables of her husband and stipulated with the bailee that if he should have any business with her husband he should not seize them, and afterwards he had a loan with her husband, and he ruled that he can seize them for his debt. And in a place where he can remove himself, there is no difference between removing himself from a thing that the Torah granted him or that the rabbis granted him [Ktzot HaChoshen]. And see what I wrote in Even HaEzer there, section 5.

Some say that even though a person cannot transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world, nevertheless, if he desires to acquire, he also transfers ownership; for since he desires to acquire, he fully resolves to transfer ownership. Therefore, two people who transferred ownership from one to the other regarding a gift that one of them will receive from another—that to whomever he gives it, he shall divide it with his fellow—it is acquired, as has been written regarding asmachta in siman 207, section 36. And even according to the opinion at the beginning of siman 176 that regarding partners in such a case they may retract for the future, this is because a laborer may retract; but without this reason, they certainly have acquired [the Gra]. And although a partner is not similar to a laborer, nevertheless, regarding this matter they are similar.

A thing that has come into the world but is not in one's possession has the status of a thing that has not yet come into the world, such that he has not acquired it and each of them may retract. This will be further explained in siman 211 and in siman 216. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that nevertheless, if the seller exerted effort and purchased the item he sold, he must fulfill his sale, for with this intent he exerted effort and purchased it, so that he may stand by his word. Thus far his words. And this is specifically when the seller knew it was not in his possession and the buyer did not know; but when the buyer also knew it was not in his possession, this reasoning does not apply, unless he explicitly promised him to procure the purchase for him—then it applies so that he may stand by his word because of the specific promise [Taz]. So too, if the seller did not know it was not in his possession, this reasoning also does not apply, and it is a mistaken purchase [Netivot HaMishpat]. And there are those who further say that this reasoning only applies to a specific object, where we say he exerted effort to purchase this object so that he may stand by his word; but regarding a thing that it is the way of this seller to trade in constantly, it is not applicable to say that for this purpose he exerted effort to purchase it, since such is the way of his trade [ibid.].

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 6: One who fixes a price according to the market rate and received money, and that species which he fixed was not in the possession of the seller, he is obligated to purchase and give to the buyer what he fixed; and if he retracted, he receives "mi she-para." But if he fixed with him before the market rate was established, such that the transaction was performed in prohibition, he may retract and does not need to receive "mi she-para." Thus far their words. For even though it is not in his possession, nevertheless, since the market rate was established and it is available to purchase, it is considered like a thing in his possession [Sma]. Therefore, if there was a complete kinyan, it is effective to acquire it entirely. And in the previous section, it deals with when the market rate was not established. And some say that even when the market rate was established, no kinyan is effective for a complete acquisition, but only for "mi she-para" [Shach]. And some say that when he fixes a price on a specific thing, such as "this wine," it does not help that the market rate was established, since it is a thing that is not common, for who is to say that the owner of this wine will agree to sell to him, and it is not even subject to "mi she-para." But with wine in general, when the market rate was established and it is available to purchase, it is as if it is in his possession and he acquires it regarding the matter of "mi she-para," but for a complete acquisition it is not effective with any kinyan whatsoever, according to the previous "some say" [Netivot HaMishpat]. And many of the great authorities decided the law according to the first opinion, that with a complete kinyan he acquires it entirely when the market rate was established and it is available to purchase. And so is the common custom among merchants who sell all types of merchandise that are not under their hand, only that they are available to purchase and the market rate is known in the province, and we have never heard that they challenge this on the grounds that it is not in his possession. And even according to the opinion of the "some say," since the custom is so, it is no worse than "situmta" in siman 201, and see what I wrote there in section 3. And it is obvious that if they wrote in a deed of obligation that he is bound to provide him such and such merchandise at such and such a price, that he is bound to provide it, for an obligation is effective even for a "davar she-lo ba l'olam," as I wrote in section 10. And with this, the custom that merchants have practiced to write "contracts" for the sale of merchandise is well-settled, even though movables are not subject to deeds, but rather because through this deed he obligates himself, and it is an obligation upon the person, and a person is judged like land. And furthermore, since the custom is so, it is like "situmta," and also by reason of "dina d'malkhuta." And "the market rate was established" is defined by that which is the way of merchants to sell at this price, and they are not exacting about a little less than the price or a little more, since such is the way of commerce [it appears to me].

Just as a person cannot transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world, so too he cannot reserve for himself something that has not yet come into the world. How so? If one sold a field to Reuven and reserved from its produce for Shimon a known amount every year, such that he said, "The field is for Reuven and such-and-such produce is for Shimon," Shimon has acquired nothing of the produce, and Reuven takes all the produce. The seller must return to Shimon his money, and the sum of those funds Reuven is obligated to give to the seller, for why should the seller lose his money? And if Reuven does not wish to give those funds that Shimon gave, the transaction is void. However, if he wishes to give them, the seller cannot void the sale, for as soon as Reuven acquired the field, he also acquired all its produce, and there is no "transaction in error" here since the seller loses nothing [so it appears to me, and that which the Sma wrote in subsection 24 requires great study]. All this applies when he sold the produce to another, but if he reserved the produce for himself—such-and-such produce per year—his reservation is a valid reservation, for we say that he reserved with a generous eye, meaning that he reserved the place of the produce, and it is like "a palm tree for its fruit," even though he did not specify. But for another, we do not say that he reserved the place of the produce unless he explicitly specified so. And see what I wrote in siman 214, section 4. When he reserved for himself, even if this buyer sold the field to another, he cannot sell the portion of this seller, and the second buyer must also give the first seller everything he reserved. But if the first seller said to the buyer, "The produce is mine as long as this field is in your hand," when he sold it to another, the power of the first seller ceased. And even if the first buyer later returned and purchased it from the second buyer, he has lost his right, for the second buyer sold to this one all the rights he possessed. Similarly, even while it is in the hand of the first buyer, if the seller dies, his heirs have nothing unless he specified "for me and for my heirs." The reason is that he cannot bequeath something that has no substance [the Gra]. Furthermore, since he only has [the right] because we say he reserved with a generous eye, it only avails for him and not for his heirs [Tur]. And some say that this is specifically when he did not reserve a specific thing but rather "produce," for then it is only like a mere condition, and therefore he must specify "for me and for my heirs." But if he reserved a specific thing, such as if he sold a house and said, "The upper story is mine," or if he reserved a specific branch in the tree, his heirs inherit after him even if it was unspecified, for the reservation did not enter into the category of the sale at all. In all that has been explained, there is no difference between a sale and a gift or the gift of a shekhiv mera. However, some disagree regarding the gift of a shekhiv mera and hold that even when he reserved for himself, it does not avail without a specific thing; since he does not expect to live and the reservation is for his heirs, we do not say that he reserves with a generous eye. And there is one who says that when he reserved for himself a fixed sum of money, such as if he said, "On condition that you give me one hundred zuz," he must give them to the heirs if he did not give them to him. But if he said, "On condition that you give me one hundred zuz every year," his intention is only for himself and not for his heirs unless he specified "for me and for my heirs." Similarly, when he said, "On condition that you give me produce for two years," it is like a fixed thing and pertains also to the heirs [see the Beit Yosef].

Even though he must give him the fruits that he reserved, nevertheless, if he did not give them to him, the sale is not voided thereby, and he can sue him for the fruits in beit din; but the fulfillment of the sale is not dependent on this, since he did not speak in the language of a condition. Therefore, if he said, "on condition that you give to me" or "to so-and-so such and such fruits," then the fulfillment of the sale is dependent on it, and if he did not give, the sale is void. For even though a person cannot transfer ownership of that which has not yet come into the world, he can nevertheless make a condition, as I wrote in section 13. And in all that has been explained, that a reservation is not effective for another but is effective for himself, there is no difference between a reservation of some of the fruits or a reservation of all the fruits. For to another it is not a reservation, and the first acquired the palm tree and its fruits, while the second acquired nothing. But when he reserved for himself, such as when he said to one, "acquire the palm tree except for its fruits," where he reserved all the fruits, it is a reservation, for he reserved the entire place of the fruits, which are the branches, and the buyer has nothing but the trunk for when it withers.