Siman 111

It has already been explained in siman 39 that the lien is from the Torah, but regarding a loan by oral agreement, the sages ordained for the sake of the order of the world not to collect from buyers or from recipients of a gift; for even a gift, although he did not give money, nevertheless, if he had not done him a favor he would not have given him a gift, and they equated it to a buyer, except for the gift of a shekhiv mera as written in siman 253. Therefore, one who lends to his fellow by oral agreement only collects from what is found in the hand of the borrower, but he does not seize either from the buyers who bought from him or from gifts that he gave even after the loan. However, from everything found in his hand he collects, whether land or movables, even if he bought them after the loan, for he collects from the borrower himself, and even from the cloak on his shoulders, for a person's properties are guarantors for him. But one who lends with a shtar, or where he performed a kinyan sudar, or where he admitted before witnesses and commanded them to write a shtar as written there, seizes from buyers and from recipients of a gift who bought or received land from him after the loan, even if it is not explicitly stated so in the shtar, for we establish that responsibility is a scribal error, whether in a loan or in one who sells land, for typically people do not lend without responsibility and do not buy lands without responsibility. But if he explicitly stated that he lent to him or sold without responsibility, such that he shall not seize from buyers and from recipients of a gift, his condition is valid. And even if the condition was not written in the shtar, but the lender or the buyer admits that they so conditioned at the time of the loan and the sale, and all the more so if there are witnesses to this; and if there is a denial between them, the borrower or the seller shall swear a hesset oath and be exempt [it appears to me]. And if in the shtar it is not explicitly clarified that he shall not seize also from recipients of a gift but only from buyers, he is able to seize from recipients of a gift, because the lender or the buyer can say that he only removed himself from buyers and not from recipients of a gift; and if it is written simply "without responsibility," he does not seize also from recipients of a gift [it appears to me]. And if he seizes from buyers from properties that the borrower bought after the loan, it will be explained in siman 112. But if the sale or the gift preceded the loan, it is a simple matter that he does not seize from them unless there is proof that he did not intend in the sale or the gift except to smuggle them from the creditor, and as written in siman 99 that the gift is void, and even if it preceded the loan, the creditor collects from it even if it is a loan by oral agreement.

Consecrations and charities, where one consecrated or gave lands to charity, they are like encumbered properties, and one does not collect from them as long as he has unencumbered properties. However, when he does not have unencumbered properties, one collects from them. And that which our sages, of blessed memory, said—that consecration nullifies an encumbrance—is only regarding the inherent sanctity of the body for the Altar or regarding a prohibition of benefit, as will be explained in siman 117. And there it will be explained that some say that even regarding consecrations in this time, the lender must redeem it for a small amount so that they do not say that a consecration leaves without redemption; see there.

A husband who mortgaged his wife's properties that were designated for her ketubah without her knowledge and consent, his law is the same as in a sale, for that which he is able to sell permanently or until she is widowed, as is written in Even HaEzer siman 90, so too he is able to mortgage. And a woman to whom another gave land, and the law is that the husband consumes the fruits, nevertheless his creditor does not collect from the fruits, just as he does not collect from the fruits of nichsei melog, because the fruits are only for the benefit of the household and not for the payment of debts. And in Even HaEzer more of these laws have been explained.

If a gift was given to the borrower, whether land or movable property, on condition that no lien shall take effect upon it—neither a debt nor a ketubah, whether they preceded the gift or are for the future—the condition is valid, for it is in the power of the giver to stipulate as he wishes. And even if the borrower had subjected to him properties that he would acquire after the loan, so that his power over properties he would acquire would be as effective as over properties he possessed at the time of the loan, we do not say that the gift automatically became subjected to him as well, for this is not in his power, as it depends on the intent of the giver. And this is specifically regarding a gift, but not regarding a sale; for example, if the borrower purchased land or movable property and the seller stipulated with him on condition that no lien shall take effect upon this, it is not effective, and the creditor of the buyer collects from it. For in any case, if the sale is voided by the condition, must not the seller return the money to him, and the creditor will receive it? Furthermore, in a sale, this condition is nothing but a deception by the buyer, for why should the seller stipulate such a thing when he has already received his money? For it is understandable regarding a gift that the giver's desire is that the recipient should always use the gift as a remembrance of the favor he did for him, but a seller who takes money for his merchandise and not because of a favor, what has he to do with such a condition? (Tur). Therefore, the purchase is valid, and he collects from the land or from the movable property that he purchased (Urim VeTumim). And even regarding a gift, if the giver died, the creditor collects from this gift, as will be explained in siman 241, section 10.

And sometimes, even regarding a gift, the condition is not effective; for example, one who gave a gift to his son on the condition that no lien shall take effect upon it, and the father died—if he has no other heir, the creditor of the son collects from it. For even though the gift is void because of the condition, nevertheless, he inherits it, and the reservation that the father reserved for himself was terminated from him upon his death, and his son inherited it. And if there are other heirs, the creditor shall collect according to the portion of this son from his inheritance (see Urim VeTummim).

One who has many debts and beit din sold the land of the debtor in order to pay the earlier creditor, the other creditors cannot return to the land and seize it from the buyer, for since beit din sold it to him to pay the earlier one, he possesses all the power of the earlier one. However, if the debtor himself sold it in order to pay the earlier one, the other creditors can seize it from the buyer, as was written in siman 104; see there.

Just as one does not collect from purchasers until the creditor swears with a sacred object that he has not been paid his debt, so too a prior creditor who comes to collect from the debtor himself, and there is another later creditor present—even if the later one is a creditor by oral loan—if the debtor does not possess assets beyond the debt of the prior creditor and the collection is from land, which is subject to the law of precedence, one does not grant the prior creditor possession of the debtor's assets until he swears a severe oath that he has not been paid anything. This applies even if there is a trust clause in the document, according to the law of one who seizes from purchasers, for he is seizing from the second creditor who loses his debt for the time being. And the prior creditor can impose a herem stam upon the later creditor if he does not know that the document of the prior creditor is unpaid and makes him swear for no reason, as was written in siman 82.

One whose promissory note was erased and the beit din wrote him another note, as has been explained in siman 41, it has the law of a complete note to seize property from purchasers with it, as has been explained in siman 70, section 9. And it was also explained there that there is one who says that even one who lent to his fellow an oral loan and he was found liable in judgment and had nothing with which to pay, and they wrote for the plaintiff a record of the act of the beit din, its law is like a loan with a note and he seizes property from purchasers with it.

Just as a creditor collects from purchasers, so too one who sells land to his fellow and did not specify that he is selling it to him without achrayut, and a creditor of the seller seized it from him, the purchaser collects from the lands of the seller that he sold after the time of his acquisition. It will be explained in siman 116 how they write the tirpa for him. There are three types of achrayut: the achrayut of the seller himself, which will be explained in siman 226 and in Even HaEzer siman 105; achrayut caused by him, such as when the creditor of the seller seized it from the purchaser; and general achrayut, such as if the land is found not to be his. These three types of achrayut are one above the other, for if he did not specify the achrayut at all, he is liable for all the achrayut, as it is a scribal error, as I wrote in section 1. All the more so if he wrote achrayut without specification. If he specified the achrayut of himself, it is as if he excluded those two types of achrayut that are above this. If he specified the achrayut caused by him, the achrayut of himself is included within it, and he excluded general achrayut. If he specified general achrayut, the two previous types of achrayut are also included (Nimukei Yosef and Ramban, first chapter of Bava Metzia). Sometimes it occurs that with achrayut of himself he collects from the purchaser, but with general achrayut he is unable to collect; for example, a beit din or an apotropos who sold the land of orphans are able to seize it from the purchaser for their own debt that preceded the sale, but they are unable to seize it from the aspect of general achrayut and to clarify that it is stolen land in the hand of the decedent and the land is theirs, since they themselves sold this land, it is as if they admitted that the land is not theirs (Sma siman 147, subsection 5). But for their debt they can collect, and as for why they sold, it is because they thought to receive their debt from another place (ibid.). This is not a contradiction to the rule that was explained, for when you examine it closely, you will find that the achrayut of themselves is not essentially of themselves, for they are only appointees over the orphans, and the general achrayut is the achrayut of themselves since it is as if they admitted (and examine this closely).

In what case are these things said, that he seizes from encumbered assets? When he does not find unencumbered assets in the possession of the borrower or in the possession of the seller from which to collect. But if he finds unencumbered assets from which to collect, even if they are ziborit, he may not seize from encumbered assets, whether from purchasers or from recipients of a gift. For since according to the Torah the legal status of a creditor is in ziborit, but they enacted that he should collect beinonit because of "locking the door," therefore, in a place of loss to purchasers and recipients of a gift, they did not enact this; for the purchaser as well, when they seize it from him, his legal status is like a creditor who is owed the money he paid for the land. And likewise, he does not seize from an earlier purchaser or recipient of a gift when there is one later than him, for at the time the earlier one purchased, he still had unencumbered assets and the lien fell upon them, and it turns out that the later one purchased his lien. Therefore, even if the earlier one is a recipient of a gift and the later one is a purchaser, they collect from the later purchaser and not from the earlier recipient of a gift [it appears to me]. Therefore, if the borrower gave a gift to others and wrote for them: land worth two hundred zuz to Reuven, and after him land worth three hundred to Shimon, and after him land worth four hundred to Levi—whoever is first in the deed acquires. And if he does not have properties corresponding to all of them, the first precedes the second, and the second the third. Even though we see that he wanted to benefit the second more than the first, and the third more than the second, nevertheless, since he wrote the language "and after him," his intention was that he should be after the one who preceded him. Therefore, if a debt deed is produced against the giver that must be collected from their gift, he collects from the last one, for he is like unencumbered assets relative to the earlier ones. And if it is not sufficient, he collects from the one before him, and if this too is not sufficient, he collects from the one before him. But if he did not write the language "and after him," but rather: two hundred to Reuven, and three hundred to Shimon, and four hundred to Levi, we do not say whoever is first in the deed acquires, for there is no precedence or lateness here, and the fact that he preceded one to the other is because it is impossible to express two things as one. Therefore, if the properties of the giver are not sufficient for all of them, they divide the properties into nine parts: Reuven takes two parts, Shimon three parts, and Levi four parts. And if a debt deed of the giver is produced against them, he collects from all of them, and according to their division in the gift, each one shall pay from his portion; that is, they divide the debt into nine parts and each one pays as I have written regarding their division. And this is not similar to what was explained in siman 104, section 15, that creditors in the properties of the borrower divide equally, for there the lien for the one of a hundred is like the one of four hundred, but with a giver of a gift, behold the giver wanted to give to this one more than to that one, and therefore we do not have the power to change the will of the giver in a matter that does not concern us [Sma]. And specifically when the gifts were not equal do we say that without "and after him" his intention was not to precede one over his fellow, because it is impossible to express two things as one. But if he gave to all of them equally, even if he did not write "and after him," we say that his intention was to precede; for if not so, he should have written to all of them together: "I have given to Ploni and Ploni and Ploni, to each one two hundred zuz." And since he wrote in detail and preceded one over his fellow, presumably his intention was to precede one another. And there are those who disagree on this, for it is the way of the world to write in detail, and since he did not write "and after him," his intention was not to precede. And in a place where they collect from the last one, even if he has ziborit and the earlier one has beinonit, they collect from him according to the law of unencumbered assets regarding encumbered assets. And in siman 253 this will be explained also regarding the gift of a shekhiv mera, see there [and what he wrote in the Levush, "and even if he seized movable property," belongs there, and study it].

Even heirs who sold the property of their father, this has the law of encumbered property, and a creditor does not seize from them since there is unencumbered property of their father. And if they did not leave unencumbered property among the assets of their father, and they wish to remove him with their own land, it was explained in siman 107 that they are not able; but with movable property they are able to remove him, see there.

This rule that one does not collect from encumbered property when there is free property applies specifically when they are in one place or in proximity of place. However, if the debtor sold land that he has in his city and he has land far from the city or in another city, the creditor seizes from the buyer and he cannot say, "I have left you free property," since it is not in his city. For behold, even the debtor himself could not have given him payment from properties he has in a distant place even if they are of superior quality when he has properties in proximity of place. In this, certainly the power of the buyer is not greater than the power of the debtor himself, for it is not equitable that he should spend a maneh for a maneh on his travel and on the expenses of bringing the produce to his home from there. However, everything is according to the assessment of the beit din, for if there is no loss to the creditor in collecting in a distant place—for example, if he also has properties there or other matters such that there is no loss to the creditor in this—he collects there since they are free property. And specifically the buyer can deflect him in such a case, but the debtor himself cannot deflect him to properties in another place when he has properties here, even when there is no loss to the creditor in this, for he can say, "I did not lend to you with this in mind." Only regarding buyers is it dependent on the assessment of the beit din [as appears to be so from the wording of our teacher, the Rema, section 11].

Just as a creditor collects from purchasers, so too with a deed of gift; if Reuven gave Shimon a gift of one hundred maneh via a deed with witnesses, and afterwards Reuven sold all his properties, Shimon collects the hundred maneh from the purchasers, for there is no distinction between a debt of a gift and an absolute debt. And similarly, if Reuven commanded due to death to give a maneh to Shimon, and the heirs sold all the properties and Shimon did not find anything from which to collect his maneh, he collects from the purchasers. The heirs cannot say that they gave it to him since the deed of the command is produced from his hand, and we also do not fear a conspiracy—that they already paid him and now they are making a conspiracy together against the purchasers—for as long as he has a deed in his hand, one cannot cast a defect upon the deed, and he takes an oath and collects according to the law of one who comes to be paid from purchasers. However, if the deed is only like a mere command, they are able to say that it is paid, as will be explained in siman 253. But if the command is a complete deed that the commander delivered during his lifetime, they are not believed to say "we paid," and it will be explained in siman 255 with the help of Heaven.

If the purchasers left unencumbered property in the hand of the debtor and they became damaged, the creditor seizes from the purchasers, for his lien is upon all the properties. But if they became damaged because of him—for example, if he removed his lien from them and accepted a kinyan that he would not collect from them—he cannot seize from the purchasers, for he caused his own loss, and so too anything similar to this. Similarly, if they were not damaged but rather it is currently not within his power to seize from them—for example, if a violent person took them—the creditor must wait, because it is common for violent people to fall, and he will collect his debt from it. But if the violent person took them according to the judgment of the secular courts, he collects from the purchasers; and similarly, if according to appearances there will be no power to extract it from the hand of the violent person, he collects from the purchasers. Furthermore, it appears to me that specifically regarding a Jewish violent person we say that it is common for violent people to fall, but not regarding a gentile violent person, for so it implies explicitly in the Yerushalmi, chapter 3 of Nedarim, halacha 4; see there. Also, regarding the essence of this law, the great later authorities disagree, for how is it possible to say to the lender "wait until the violent person falls"? And all the more so if the debtor himself apostatized to a gentile religion in a manner that from now on it will not be within the power of the lender to collect from his unencumbered property according to their laws, it is like they were damaged in his hand and he seizes from the purchasers. Similarly, some say that if the debtor died and left minor orphans, such that the lender must wait until they grow up, it is like they were damaged and he seizes from the purchasers. And there are those who disagree on this, for behold the minors are subject to obligation, but he is forced to wait until they grow up, and yet the properties were not damaged; and such is the primary view [Urim VeTumim]. And this which we said, that if the unencumbered property was damaged he collects from the encumbered property, applies even if the time for payment arrived and the lender was negligent in demanding his debt and being paid from the unencumbered property, and after some time the unencumbered property was damaged, he collects from the encumbered property; for this is not called negligence, for how could he have brought it to his mind that the properties would become damaged?

A borrower who comes to sell his lands to a non-Jew or to a violent person in a manner such that if the lender needs to seize them he will not be able to, and the lender wants the beit din to prevent the sale because he fears he will have nothing from which to collect when the time arrives to be paid from him—he does not have the power to prevent it, just as he does not have the power to prevent him from selling his movables even though he will not be able to seize them from purchasers. And the reason is that since the time for payment of his document has not yet arrived, the borrower has the power to do as he wishes with his property, for he can say: "When your time arrives, I will pay you from another source." However, the seller has not done well and it is a transgression in his hand, for he damages the lien of his fellow if he does not have from where to pay from another source. Therefore, if it truly appears to the beit din that there will be no place from which to collect the debt of the lender afterwards, they can prevent it, for it is no worse than the distraint that was explained in siman 73, and it is incumbent upon the beit din to see that the lender is not damaged.

If there are two or three purchasers here who bought equal fields from the borrower at the same time, and none of them precedes the other, and a creditor comes to seize, he collects from whichever of them he desires and does not need to take half a field from this one and half a field from that one, as has been written in siman 107 regarding heirs. However, if there were many fields here and his debt reaches the value of several fields and he is able to collect a field from each one of them, he collects from all of them and not from one of them. And if the borrower made one of the fields an apoteiki, he collects his entire debt from it [Taz]. And when he collects from one, this purchaser has no claim against the second [Beit Yosef], since the choice is in the hand of the lender to collect a complete field from whomever he desires, his own fortune caused it. And see what I wrote in siman 174, section 14.

If the purchaser who bought from the debtor sold it to another, and the other to another, even up to a hundred, and the creditor comes to seize from the final purchaser, he cannot say: "Why did you not claim your debt from the first?" For perhaps he did not wish to claim until now, as sometimes the debtor is violent, or the creditor is wealthy and has many debts and does not remember them all until it happens to come to his hand. However, regarding an old document, there is a need for inquiry and investigation [Tur].

A borrower who sold his properties and the lender signed on the deed of sale did not lose his right because of this, as in siman 147, for he cannot protest and say that the field is his when he is signed as a witness. For here, he does not claim regarding the body of the field that it is his, but rather that he has a shiebud upon it, and he thought that the borrower would pay him from elsewhere. And even if according to the estimation he did not have anything then from which to collect his debt except for this field, nevertheless he did not lose his right such that we would say that he waived his shiebud to him, for this is no proof at all. And even if he admits that he thought at the time of the act of his debt, he can say that he wanted this person to take it and that he would seize it from him, because he is more comfortable for him than the borrower, and it is easier for him to seize from him than to seize from the borrower, and I knew that this buyer would collect his money from the borrower [as mentioned above regarding the reasoning of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 17]. And likewise, if Reuven bought a house from Shimon and Levi had a deed of shiebud on that house, and Levi was present when Reuven bought the house and did not produce his deed, and even though Reuven demolished the house and built in it and appointed Levi over the construction, and afterwards Levi produced his deed, he did not lose his right through his silence, since he has only a shiebud.

If the lender has nothing from which to collect from the borrower except for property that the borrower gave to someone as a gift on condition of return: if the gift preceded the loan, if it was given for a known time, the recipient acquires the gift until its time arrives, and afterwards the lender may seize it. And if he gave it to him indefinitely as a gift on condition of return, and did not specify at what time he must return it to him—just as the recipient could have pushed off the borrower for a long time, as he could say to him every time he claims its return, "I will return it to you after some time," for since he did not establish the time it is as if he explicitly stated "whenever you want, return it to me" [Urim VeTummim]—likewise he can push off the lender who comes by his power. And only in this can the lender compel him: that when he returns it, he shall return it only to him and not to the giver, if the lender fears that it will be difficult for him to collect it from the borrower. And even if the gift is movable property, he collects from it [it appears to me]. And if the loan preceded the gift, then if it is land that he purchased before he borrowed, or even after he borrowed provided that he wrote to him "that which I shall acquire," his gift is nothing, for it has no more power than a complete gift, from which the lender collects when the borrower has no other property. But if it is movable property upon which there is no lien, its law is like when the gift preceded the loan, that when he must return it, he shall return it to him and not to the giver, as I have written.

In siman 112 it will be explained that the lender does not seize from encumbered properties that the borrower purchased after the loan when he did not write for him in his deed "that which I shall acquire," and this is only from buyers; however, when he purchased after the loan and died, the lender collects from his heirs even when he did not write for him "that which I shall acquire," for the heir's status is like that of his benefactor for all matters, and this is not a change of domain. And even from movable property that he purchased afterward and bequeathed, he collects from the heir according to our practice, for we collect movable property from heirs as I wrote in siman 107 [it appears to me]. And even though there are those who disagree on this, nevertheless, such is the primary halacha [Shach and the later authorities].

Reuven lent to Shimon orally, and Shimon lent to Levi with a shtar, and Levi sold all his properties. Reuven came to seize from the purchasers who bought from Levi by power of the shtar that Shimon holds against him; the law is with him. Since Shimon admits that he is indebted to him, he possesses all the power of Shimon, even though his loan to Shimon was oral. And even though Shimon himself could have claimed to Reuven, "I paid you," nevertheless, the purchasers cannot deflect him with this claim and say that Shimon made a conspiracy with him, for behold, ultimately they are compelled to pay Shimon by power of the shtar, and consequently, when he admits to Reuven, they are obligated to pay Reuven. This has already been explained in siman 86, section 11.

Even though the lender does not collect from movable property and money that are not in the possession of the borrower, nevertheless, he collects from the borrowers of the borrower. For example, if the borrower had no assets except for debt contracts against others, it is not necessary to state that while they are still in the possession of the borrower, it is obvious that his lender collects from them, even if he did not subordinate movable property to him along with landed property, and he does not need to perform any formal acquisition for him via writing and delivery; for behold, he collects by the rule of Rabbi Nathan, for just as the debtor of the borrower is subordinated to the borrower, so too is he subordinated to his lender. Rather, even if the borrower died and the contracts fell before his heirs, he collects from them. And it is not necessary to state if the contracts that the borrower has against his debtors were made before he borrowed from his lender; rather, even if the contracts were made after he borrowed from his lender, and even if the debtors of the borrower also acquired assets after the borrower borrowed from this lender, and even if they also acquired after they themselves borrowed from the borrower [Sma], the lender collects from them and also from their heirs by the rule of Rabbi Nathan. And if the borrower sold the debt contracts or gave them to another after he borrowed from his lender, if there is in the contract of his lender a subordination of movable property along with landed property, he collects from the purchasers, for regarding contracts they did not enact the "market regulation," and they are subject to the law of precedence like land, as I wrote in siman 60. And likewise, if the borrowers who borrowed from the borrower sold their contracts that they have against others after they borrowed from this borrower, and at the time they borrowed they had their contracts [ibid.], if it was written in the contract of their lender—who is the borrower from this lender—a subordination of movable property along with landed property, the first lender collects from the purchasers who bought from the second borrowers, even if in his own contract movable property along with landed property was not written [ibid.], for the first lender stands in the place of the second lender for all matters, and the assets of the debtors of the borrower are subordinated to his lender through his power, since he precedes the sale that they made. And if the second borrowers have land, he does not need a subordination of movable property along with landed property, for the first lender removes them by the rule of Rabbi Nathan. And likewise, if the purchasers who bought the debt contracts collected land for their debt, the first lender collects from them [Shach].

If the debtor had two creditors who lent to him and they come as one to collect from his debtors, if the debtor lent to his debtors with a document after he had borrowed from both of them, they shall divide, for the lien of both took effect simultaneously. And even if he wrote for them "that which I shall acquire," the lien of the first does not take effect earlier, because we hold that if one borrowed and borrowed and then acquired, they shall divide, even when he wrote "that which I shall acquire," as written in siman 104. And even if they collected land from them, the first has no law of precedence, for as soon as he lent to his debtors, they became liened to both of them equally through the rule of Rabbi Natan. Only if he wrote "that which I shall acquire" for one and did not write it for the other, the one for whom he wrote it collects according to the first opinion there in section 11. And if one of them seized money or movable property from the debtor's debtor, he has acquired it through his seizure, as is explained there, for seizure is effective for movable property according to all opinions, see there; and the same applies if they seized from his debtors, for through the rule of Rabbi Natan they are liened to the creditors of their creditor. However, if the debts of the debtor existed before he borrowed from the two of them, if they come to collect land from the second debtors, the first has precedence, just as if they were coming to collect land from their own debtor, for whatever power they have over the first, they have over the second through the rule of Rabbi Natan, since for land there is a law of precedence. But if they come to collect money or movable property, they shall divide. And if the debts of the debtor were after he borrowed from the first and before he borrowed from the second, if the collection from the second debtors is from land and he did not write "that which I shall acquire" for the first, it depends on the two opinions we explained there; and if he wrote for him "that which I shall acquire," the first collects. And if the collection is from money or from movable property, they shall divide. And if he wrote "that which I shall acquire" for the first and also liened to him movable property incidental to land, the first has acquired them. And if the debtors of the debtor liened to him movable property incidental to land, then their law is like land for everything that has been explained. The general principle of the matter is that the power the creditors have over their debtor, they also have over the debtors who borrowed from their debtor through the rule of Rabbi Natan.

There was a case involving Reuven, who held a shtar against Shimon and gave it to Levi through writing and delivery. When Levi came to collect it from Shimon, Yehuda produced a shtar that he held against Reuven, dated earlier than the shtar that Reuven held against Shimon, and said that the shtar Reuven gave to Levi is the property of his debtor and he has acquired it by the law of precedence. The Rosh, of blessed memory, ruled that the law is with Yehuda, since his shtar is earlier and he [Reuven] had subordinated movable property to him along with land and wrote for him "what I shall acquire" [Sma], for there is no "market regulation" regarding shtarot. And this law is similar to the law in section 22.