Siman 104

It has already been explained in siman 39 that the lien is from the Torah, for from the Torah, once one borrows from his fellow, all his properties are liened to him and they are as his, whether land or movable property. And if the borrower sold them, the creditor reclaims them from the purchasers, and if a later creditor collected them, he reclaims it from him, for his lien is earlier. Only regarding movable property did the sages enact not to seize from purchasers or from a later creditor for the sake of the order of the world, as is written there. And it appears to me that even though there is no law of precedence in movable property, this is regarding a sale or regarding a later creditor who preceded and collected, or when the two creditors come to collect at once and they divide between them. But when the earlier creditor comes before us and the later one is not before us, or the time of the later one has not yet arrived, we collect for the earlier one all the movable property of the borrower. But for the later one who comes first, we only collect for him half; for since from the Torah the earlier one precedes, granted that the sages nullified his precedence, this was regarding a sale or when they come to collect at once or if the later one already collected, for there is in this the order of the world, as it is impossible to know regarding movable property as is written there. But when the earlier one is before us and the later one is not before us, what "locking of the door" is there in this when we collect everything for him? And why should we not establish it upon the Torah law? [And with this, the contradiction of the author from section 1 to section 10 is settled, which the Sma questioned; and so it appears in Rashi, Arachin 7b, s.v. "what he collected," and in Tosafot, Ketubot 90a, s.v. "what he collected"; and the question of the Gra from the contradiction of the Rif there from chapter 9 to chapter 10 is settled, see there and examine closely].

One who has many creditors with shtarot, whoever's time of kinyan of his shtar preceded is prior in collecting, even if the time of payment of the later one arrived first; for example, if he borrowed with a shtar from Reuven in Nisan for a duration of a year, and afterwards borrowed from Shimon in Iyar for half a year. The reason is because from the time of the loan he became enslaved to Reuven, and he collects whether from the borrower himself or from purchasers who bought land from the borrower. And if the later one preceded and collected land, even if they collected for him in the presence of the earlier one and he remained silent, they remove it from his hand, for a later creditor who preceded and collected land, what he collected he has not collected. However, when the later one comes to collect, they collect for him, and when the time of the earlier one comes to collect, they seize it from him. And specifically when he comes to collect land, but when the later one comes to collect metaltelin, the earlier one can prevent them from being collected for him, even if the time of the earlier one has not yet arrived, lest he smuggle them or lose them. Furthermore, if the later one collects, the earlier one will no longer be able to remove them from him, for there is no precedence in metaltelin as I wrote in section 1. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that if the borrower himself gives the metaltelin to the later one, some say that the earlier creditor cannot protest. Thus far his words. And specifically when the time of the earlier one has not yet arrived, for then just as he has permission to sell, so too he has permission to give to a creditor; but when his time has arrived, certainly he can protest, and they divide between them [it appears to me].

Even though if the later creditor preceded and collected land, the earlier creditor may seize it from him, nevertheless, if the later creditor collected medium-quality land and left inferior-quality land as free assets for the earlier creditor, what he collected, he has collected. For according to the Torah, the law of a creditor is only for inferior-quality land, as was written in siman 102, and why should he seize it from the later creditor? And there is no "locking of the door" in this. And likewise, if the later creditor left movables with the debtor for the earlier creditor, what he collected, he has collected, for movables are better than inferior-quality land, as was written in siman 101, section 2.

A later creditor who preceded and collected land and sold it before the first was able to remove it from his hand, the earlier one does not return to him even if the money is still in his hand; rather, he returns to the purchasers in whose hand his lien remains. The reason is that his collection is a valid collection for its time, except that the earlier one has the authority to remove it from his hand. Just as if the debtor himself sold, he removes it from the purchasers and the purchasers return to the debtor, so too the earlier one returns to the purchasers who bought from the later one, and they return to the later one, and the later one returns to the debtor. If he sold it to a violent person from whom it is impossible to remove it, the later one is obligated to pay the earlier one even if the money is not in his hand, by the law of garmi, for one who damages the lien of his fellow is obligated to pay. If he left inferior land in the hand of the debtor and the debtor sold them, the earlier one collects from the purchasers who bought from the debtor even though they are inferior land, for the reason explained in section 3. And if the inferior land was spoiled in the hand of the debtor or in the hand of the purchasers, he collects medium land from the later one; for just as we established regarding purchasers that when they left unencumbered property in the hand of the debtor and it was spoiled, the creditor collects from the purchasers, as will be explained in siman 111, so too a later creditor is no better than a purchaser. For this reason, if the later one left movable property with the debtor and the debtor sold them, he returns and collects the land from the later one [it appears to me]. And even though it is possible to say that since he is also a creditor and has a lien on the debtor like the earlier one, and since at the time of collection he left a place for the earlier one, and what he collected he collected, we do not pay heed to what was spoiled afterward; nevertheless, it appears that he is no better than purchasers.

Regarding movable property and likewise regarding slaves, the law of priority does not apply to them in the sense that if the later creditor preceded and collected, we do not remove it from his hand. Likewise, if both came as one, they divide it. Moreover, even if the earlier creditor stood and seized them from the later creditor after he had preceded and collected, his seizure is not a valid seizure, and the later creditor removes it from the hand of the earlier creditor in beit din. And slaves specifically when he did not make them an apoteiki, for if he made them an apoteiki, their law is like land, as I wrote in siman 117.

Documents do not have priority like movable property, and they are even inferior to movable property in that the law of seizure does not apply to them at all. Even if the earlier creditor seized the documents of the debtor, it is not like the seizure of movable property and they shall divide, because their essence is not money. This is not like one who preceded and collected, for the essence of the lien still remains with the debtor, who is the creditor of the documents, and it is still in his power to forgive the debt as written in siman 66. Furthermore, they require writing and delivery as written there. Therefore, if he wrote and delivered to him, even to the later creditor, he has acquired it; even though he can forgive the debt, nevertheless, since he wrote and delivered, it is like a sale such that he cannot extract it from the buyer [Ktzot HaChoshen]. Regarding mamranot and documents written to "any bearer," even though they do not require writing and delivery, nevertheless, if he seized them on his own, his seizure is not a valid seizure since there is no other mind to transfer ownership to him. Therefore, if he seized them on his own, they shall divide, and if the debtor delivered them to him, they are like movable property [ibid.].

It is not called collection unless the beit din appraised the movable property and placed them in his hand, or even if they delivered them to him without appraisal, or even if the creditor seized them himself, since they are in his possession it was a seizure [Shach]. But if the beit din closed the store of the debtor on behalf of one creditor, or the creditor himself closed it, this is not collection, and if more creditors come, they also collect from the store, for as long as it has not come into the hand of the creditor it is not collection and they shall all divide. And likewise, if the beit din delivered the movable property of the debtor into the hand of a trustee on behalf of one creditor until they clarify the amount of the debt or another matter necessary to clarify regarding the debt, it is not yet considered as collected, and if more creditors come they shall divide. But if the creditor himself seized them, even if he delivered them to a trustee for some reason, or if the beit din delivered to a trustee to acquire on behalf of the creditor, it is as collected [it appears to me]. And a beit din that attached the money of Reuven that is in the hand of Shimon on behalf of the debt of Levi, and Shimon transgressed and gave them to Reuven, Shimon is liable to pay if Levi does not find from what to collect from Reuven, as written in siman 86. And if his debt is one hundred and he seized fifty in movable property, for that which he collected, he collected; nevertheless, in the remaining fifty he shall take his portion like all the creditors, and they do not deduct for him what he collected [Urim VeTummim].

Even though regarding a later creditor who preceded others and collected movable property, what he collected is collected, nevertheless, it is an obligation upon the beit din when creditors come before them to make a division between them and an arrangement with the debtor, if they know that there are other creditors even though they are not here, to set aside for them according to their portion, since the law of precedence does not apply to them [Shach]. And also upon the debtor himself is the obligation to do so, for what is the sin of these creditors who are not here? And the Torah's ways are ways of pleasantness. And see what I wrote in section 1.

A creditor who collected his debt from the land of the debtor according to proclamations that they made, and afterwards an earlier creditor came to remove it from him, and the later one claimed: "Since you did not protest at the time of the proclamations, you have lost out thereby"—if the proclamation went out that anyone who has a right or a lien on this land should come and protest, and if he does not come his rights will be nullified, even though by the law there is no power in a proclamation to nullify the rights of this person, nevertheless, if they practiced thus, that anyone who heard and did not come his rights are nullified, we follow the custom, and he cannot remove it from the hand of the later one, and he shall collect from the debtor when he has it. And if the earlier one claims that he did not hear of the proclamation, his claim is a claim and he has not lost his right, and we do not say that presumably he heard because "a friend has a friend" as in the case of a protest which will be explained in siman 146, for it is not similar; for there, everyone sees that this person is possessing the field upon which so-and-so made a protest, and certainly they told him, and he is not believed to say that he did not hear. But here, who knows that this person has a debt on this land? And it could truly be that he did not know of the proclamation at all. And likewise, if they proclaimed generally, "anyone who has a right on the land of so-and-so should come and protest," and they did not conclude that whoever does not come his rights will be nullified, his rights are not nullified even when he heard the proclamation, for he can say that he did not have an opportune time to come, and since they did not proclaim a nullification of rights, he did not concern himself to come until he would have an opportune time, and he removes it from the later one. And it appears to me that for this, custom does not avail. And that which a certain great one wrote in a responsum, that if the community proclaimed that even one who does not hear the proclamation shall lose out, the authority is in their hands, for the property declared ownerless by a beit din is ownerless—it must be said that they were forced to enact this because of some great need that affected the whole city, for if not so, who gave them this power?

If the borrower is an Egyptian and borrowed from several Jews, and according to their laws whoever attaches the assets of the borrower takes precedence, or whoever the city official or the officer distrains on his behalf, another creditor no longer has a portion in this, and a dispute arises between the lenders where each one says that he attached first, and it is not known in beit din who attached first, and the officer testifies according to the words of one of them, he is believed by power of dina d'malkhuta if the custom is such and when the officer is a man of truth and will not lie. And similarly, if one collected from the Egyptian and the second claims against him that he collected unlawfully as he did not owe him at all, since he collected by dina d'malkhuta, what he collected, he collected. And this is all regarding an Egyptian borrower, but not regarding a Jewish borrower, unlike the one who disagrees on this [Levush and Acharonim].

That which has been explained, that the law of precedence applies to land, this is regarding lands that he possessed prior to borrowing, for then the lien of the lender took effect immediately upon that land before he borrowed from the second. However, if he purchased the land after he had also borrowed from the second, even though he subordinated to each of them also that which he was destined to purchase—such as where it is written in the documents "that which I have acquired and that which I am destined to acquire"—the earlier creditor has no law of precedence in them. This is because when he purchased the land, the lien of both of them took effect equally. And since there is no law of precedence in this, whoever preceded and merited through his seizure has merited, even if he is the later one. And some say that this is specifically if the beit din or the borrower himself gave him possession, but when he seized it on his own, he does not merit alone and they shall divide it, for seizure is not applicable to land [Shach], as regarding land only the language of "collection" is applicable and not "seizure." And this law is a legal doubt, and it is difficult to extract from the one in possession [Urim VeTummim]. And if he purchased land after he borrowed from the first and before he borrowed from the second, if he did not write "de'ikne" to the first, there is one who says that the second merited it alone and not the first [Sma], and there is one who says they shall divide it [Shach]. And the reason is that for unencumbered property, one does not need to write "de'ikne," for the borrower is obligated to pay, and all the unencumbered property of the borrower—including those he purchased afterwards—are guarantors for him. Therefore, even though regarding collection from purchasers the second is prior and the first does not have this power, nevertheless, regarding unencumbered property they are equal, and therefore they shall divide [it appears to me]. And there are those of the later authorities who agreed with the first opinion, and the law requires further study. And if he wrote "de'ikne" to the first, the land is subordinated to the first and he is prior in collection, and so too even if there were a hundred. And the reason is that immediately when he purchased the land, the lien of the first took effect upon it before he borrowed from the second, and he is considered earlier even though he also wrote "de'ikne" to the second [Sma]. And if he borrowed and borrowed and afterwards purchased, and wrote "de'ikne" to one and did not write it to the other, and they are unencumbered property in the hand of the borrower, some say that the one to whom he wrote "de'ikne" collects [Beit Yosef and Bach], and some say they shall divide [Shach], for since the field has not yet left his possession and they come to collect from him, it became subordinated to both of them equally.

If he subordinated movable property to the lender by way of land, their law is like land, and he collects from purchasers and from a later creditor. And if he wrote for him "what I shall acquire" even regarding the movable property, he collects even from the movable property that he acquired afterwards and sold or gave away. It has already been explained at the beginning of siman 60 that even though according to the core law this is so, nevertheless, it is already the custom, due to the "market enactment," not to collect from movable property that one sold or gave away, for if not so, you would have no person who would purchase movable property. And if they collect them from a later creditor, we explained there that there is a dispute of the poskim regarding this. And even according to that opinion that if the later creditor preceded and collected, we remove it from his hand, this is specifically when it was clarified by witnesses that these items of movable property were in his possession before he borrowed from both of them. But if it was not clarified so by witnesses, we maintain them as one who "borrowed and borrowed and then acquired," where they divide when they come as one, and if the second preceded and collected, he has merited, as I wrote. And if the later creditor preceded and collected coins, it is impossible to remove them from his hand in any manner, for there is no identifying mark on currency such that witnesses could testify regarding these coins that they saw them in the hand of the borrower. Therefore, the one who seizes them merits, even when he is the later one, and even if when he borrowed he transferred to him movable property by way of land and also transferred the coins so, and also wrote for him "what I shall acquire," nevertheless, since it can be said that he borrowed and borrowed by way of land and with "what I shall acquire" and afterwards acquired, the one who seizes merits. And if it is possible to clarify by witnesses, the first merits; and everything is according to the sight of the eyes of the judge.

Even though a creditor seizes land from purchasers, nevertheless, sometimes even if it was sold after his loan, he cannot collect it. How so? Behold, if a beit din sold the land of a debtor to collect it for an earlier creditor, the later creditor cannot seize it from the purchaser, because the purchaser possesses all the power of the earlier creditor since it was sold by the authority of a beit din. However, if the debtor himself sold it in order to pay the earlier creditor, the later creditor seizes it from the purchaser, for behold, the purchaser stands in the place of the debtor, and just as he seizes from the debtor, so too he seizes from him. But when he purchased from a beit din, the power of a beit din is strong, such that his power is as effective as the power of the one for whom it was sold.

The law of precedence applies only when the date of the earlier document was written on a day prior to the later one. However, if both were written on the same day, even if he borrowed from one in the morning and the document was delivered to him in the morning, and from another he borrowed in the evening, there is no law of precedence regarding them. And even though regarding a gift it will be explained in siman 240 that whoever it was delivered to first on that day has acquired it, this is specifically regarding a gift or a sale. But regarding a promissory note, where one only collects from purchasers who purchased on the same day, both are equal in their lien even if it was delivered to one earlier. And in a place where they write hours in documents, the law of the hour is like the law of the day.

Promissory notes whose dates are all one day, or one hour in a place where they record hours, and they all came together to collect; and similarly, even if one of them is prior but they came to collect movable property, for in them there is no law of priority as I wrote in section 1; or if they came to collect from landed property that the debtor acquired after he borrowed from the last of them, such that the lien of all of them is equal as has been explained, and there is not enough in the assets for each of them to collect his debt in full, they divide among themselves. And if they seize from purchasers, the purchasers also take their portion when everyone takes, for why should they be diminished more than all the creditors since there is nothing to collect from the debtor [Maggid Mishneh, chapter 20 of Malveh]. And how do they divide? If all the creditors are equal in their amounts, they divide portion for portion according to what reaches each one. And if they are not equal in their amounts, they first divide the amount according to what reaches the smallest among them to the extent of his debt, and the remaining creditors return and divide the remainder also in this manner. How so? There were three debts: this one's was one hundred, this one's two hundred, and this one's three hundred. If everything found there was only three hundred, and certainly less, they all divide equally. If there was found there more than three hundred, they first divide three hundred equally and the owner of the hundred departs, and the two divide the remainder also in this manner. How so? There was found there five hundred or less, they divide three hundred equally and the one departs, and they return and divide the two hundred or less than that between the two. If there was found there six hundred or less, but more than five hundred, they divide three hundred equally and the owner of the hundred departs, and they return and divide two hundred between the two and the owner of the two hundred departs, and the owner of the three hundred receives the remainder. And in this manner they divide even if they are a hundred when they come to collect as one. And why do they divide in several stages and not at one time in this manner? Because first they divide the medium-quality land, for their law is in medium-quality land, and afterwards they divide the poor-quality land, and afterwards they divide the best-quality land [Sma]. And there is one who holds that they divide everything found into parts; for example, if to one reaches one hundred, and to one two hundred, and to one three hundred, they divide everything found into six parts, and the owner of the hundred takes one part, and the owner of the two hundred two parts, and the owner of the three hundred three parts. And according to this, the small creditor will never take in full if the large one does not take in full. And this division is like partners who profited, which will be explained in siman 176. However, the primary view is like the first opinion, and it is not similar to a partnership, for there the portion of each one is clarified and therefore each one takes according to his portion, but regarding a creditor, the lien of the owner of the hundred applies to all the assets just like the lien of the owner of the three hundred, and as long as he does not receive his hundred, he will not let the owner of the three hundred receive even a hundred, for he has a lien on all the assets just like the creditor of three hundred. Therefore, the primary law is like the first opinion. Nevertheless, we see actions every day that when they perform a division for creditors, they divide according to the value of the debts and like the second opinion. Therefore, it is proper to compromise in this according to the will of the creditors, but the primary law is as I have written.

If one has two debts that he lent to him at two different times, he is like two people and takes with each shtar his portion according to the distribution that has been explained. And even one who produced two shtarei chov against one person that were made on the same day for the same amount—whether different witnesses signed the second shtar or whether the same witnesses who signed the first signed the second—he collects both of them. We do not say that both were made for a single loan, as we say regarding deeds of sale and gifts in such a case that the second nullified the first, as will be explained in siman 240. For there, it is necessary to say so, as it is impossible to fulfill two sales on one field; but regarding a loan, how can we nullify a shtar with witnesses? Rather, we say that there were two loans. Furthermore, the borrower presumably would not have left two shtarot in his possession for one loan [Sma]. And two shtarot that were made for one loan—half the loan in one shtar and half in the second shtar—and they were written on the same day, and it was clarified that it is one loan but they divided them into two shtarot: if they are shtarot with witnesses, we consider each shtar individually regarding the distribution; but if they are only in the handwriting of the borrower, it is only one debt. And there is no difference whether it is written in the name of the lender or to anyone who produces it [Urim VeTummim]. And even a milveh al peh, if they are two loans, we consider each debt individually. And some say that this matter of considering them as two loans when he divided the debt in shtarot with witnesses applies specifically regarding lands upon which their lien rests, but regarding movable property, they are only as one loan [Netivot HaMishpat].

In every place that we say in this siman "they shall divide" or that the first one who seizes the assets has merited, he must first swear that he has not yet been paid his debt. This is so even if there is a clause of trustworthiness in his deed, for just as against purchasers he must swear and the trustworthiness given to him by the debtor is of no effect, so too against the other creditor, for it is not within the power of the debtor to grant him trustworthiness against others. Therefore, every creditor can administer an oath to the other creditor if he incurs a loss through the other's collection, as I wrote in siman 82; see there. And perhaps from this stems our custom not to be exacting in the division of debts according to the primary law in section 15, as I wrote there at the end of the section, because if the holder of the small sum wishes to collect his entire debt, the other creditors will administer an oath to him.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1: There are those who say that regarding something that is not currently in existence and is destined to come later, the law of precedence does not apply to it; and if before it came into existence he swore to give it to a later creditor, he must fulfill his oath. Thus far his words. And there are those who disagree on this, and we have already explained it in siman 99, section 5; see there.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 13: Regarding a loan with a document and an oral loan that is earlier, the oral loan is prior for collecting from unencumbered property, since witnesses testify that it preceded. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1 regarding the matter that if the later creditor preceded and collected land, we remove it from his hand, that all this applies to a loan with a document; but regarding an oral loan, if the later creditor preceded and collected, what he collected, he has collected. Thus far his words. It is explained from their words that even though an oral loan does not collect from purchasers, nevertheless, from the borrower himself its law is like a loan with a document, since from the Torah the borrower's properties are liened even in an oral loan. Therefore, the law of priority applies to land even in an oral loan, and it even precedes a loan with a document when it is earlier, and certainly it precedes a later oral loan. However, regarding removing it from the hand of the later creditor, it is not similar to a loan with a document, and if the later creditor preceded and collected, what he collected, he has collected. This is the opinion of Rav Hai Gaon, that regarding unencumbered property there is a law of priority even in an oral loan, since there is no "locking of the door" here; and therefore, to remove it from the later creditor is impossible, as there would be a "locking of the door" in this, since it has no voice and the loan is not known, the later creditor could not have guarded himself [it appears to me]. But there are those of our teachers who disagree on this, for the Rif, of blessed memory, holds that a later loan with a document precedes an earlier oral loan, for in this too there is a "locking of the door," as everyone would be afraid to lend even with a document due to the concern that perhaps there is an earlier oral loan, since this has no voice. For the halacha, some say they shall divide [Shach]. And there is one who decided that if both are oral, the earlier one precedes, since the lien is from the Torah and there is no "locking of the door" here, why should it not be prior? But with an earlier oral loan and a later loan with a document, it is a legal doubt [Urim VeTummim]. And all this is regarding land that he had at the time of the loan, but for properties that he bought afterwards and did not write "that which I will acquire," and for movable property, certainly there is no priority and they divide [ibid.]. And this fact that an oral loan divides or takes everything when it is earlier according to the first opinion, this is specifically when the holders of the documents admit to him or he brings witnesses, but without this he is not believed, for perhaps he made a conspiracy with the borrower against the holder of the document [Radbaz]. And a document in his own handwriting, its law is like an oral loan, as I wrote in siman 69. And a document of deposit, even with witnesses, its law is like an oral loan and it does not collect from encumbered property [Shach ibid. subsection 14]. And therefore, with documents of iska, one does not collect from encumbered property except for the half that is a loan [it appears to me].

In siman 248 it will be explained that when one says, "My properties are to Reuven, and after him to Shimon," Reuven consumes the fruits all the days of his life, and when he dies, the properties remain in the hand of Shimon. And if Reuven went ahead and sold them, Shimon does not extract them from the hand of the purchasers, for the second has nothing except what the first left over; however, ab initio it is forbidden for Reuven to do so. And if this Reuven had debts upon him, and the creditor did not find properties for him from which to collect his debt except what was given to him with "and after you to so-and-so," and the creditor came to beit din to collect for him from these properties, even though Reuven is alive, beit din does not collect for him from the body of the properties, but from the fruits alone. And even though there are those who say that just as he has the power to sell them, so too he has the power to encumber them and the creditor collects the body of the land, leave it, for the halacha is not so; for when he sold, no power remained for him, but with an encumbrance where he can redeem it, and if he were to redeem it, the so-and-so would have a right in it, and since he has a right, the encumbrance of the creditor does not take effect [Sma]. And if Reuven died and a creditor came to collect from these properties, they do not collect anything for him, even if he made them an apoteiki, but rather they belong to the second, for once he died his power ceased and they belong to the second.

Two who lent to an Egyptian one after the other, and there is not enough in the assets of the borrower for this one and that one, and when Reuven, the earlier one, came to collect his document, principal and interest, Shimon claimed that the interest that accrued from the time of Shimon's document shall not be collected until I collect my principal debt, for my principal is prior to your interest that accrued after I lent to him, as interest does not take effect from the time of the document but rather increases every day—there is nothing in the words of Shimon. For from the time of Reuven's document, the borrower obligated himself to all the interest that will accrue until the end of the loan period. And the same applies if the borrower was an Israelite and the interest was according to the permits explained in the laws of interest [it appears to me]. And specifically the interest that accrued until the time of payment, but if he wishes to pay him the interest that accrued until today, even though the loan was for a longer duration of time, he can compel him in this, as I wrote in siman 86; see there.

A borrower who has nothing with which to pay, and a house fell upon the borrower and upon his legator, such as his father whom he is fit to inherit, and it is not known who died first, the borrower or his legator, and the children of the borrower say, "Our father died first and inherited from his legator in the grave and bequeathed to us, and the creditor has nothing to take from it," and the creditor says, "The legator died first and the borrower inherited from him while he was still alive and I shall collect from his heirs"—the law is with the heirs. This is because the assets are in the presumptive possession of the family of the heirs who are established in them, and he who comes to remove them from their possession must bring clear proof that it is as he says. And behold, this law is found in the Shas, and there are some of the poskim who inferred from this that a creditor does not collect from "ra'ui" (prospective assets), meaning that which did not come into the hand of the borrower during his lifetime but was only fit to come; and since it did not come into his hand during his lifetime, the creditor does not collect from them. And according to this, if the borrower hired himself out to someone and died and did not receive his wages during his lifetime, the creditor does not collect from this and it belongs to the heirs. And some say that a creditor does collect from ra'ui, and the reason he does not collect in the case where the house fell is because the children of the borrower can say, "We do not inherit by power of our father, but rather by power of our grandfather, for since our father is not alive, we are the heirs to our grandfather," and so too with other legators; and therefore from wages of labor or from other ra'ui the creditor takes. And since there is no decisive ruling in this, it is a "safeka de-dina" (legal doubt). However, regarding wages of labor, the great Acharonim agreed that the creditor takes. And so too from his loans, the creditor also takes after the death of the borrower, even though regarding a firstborn a loan is called ra'ui, as will be explained in siman 278; for since the money was in his hand, and similarly wages of labor he earned himself, the creditor takes from this, and such is the primary law. And so wrote the Tur in siman 106, that a creditor collects from a loan that the borrower left after his death. And regarding the matter of a "shtar chatzi zachar," whether it collects from ra'ui, it was explained in Even HaEzer.