Siman 1

Everything explained in these laws is only with the permission of the government of His Majesty the Emperor, may his glory be exalted, and the law of the kingdom is the law. It is a positive commandment from the Torah to appoint judges, as it is said: "Judges and officers you shall appoint for yourself," etc. And they must be ordained specifically in the Land of Israel; that is, three sages, and one of them is ordained [the Rambam, chapter 4 of Sanhedrin], when they see a sage worthy of judging and instructing, they ordain him and call him "Rabbi." And Moses our teacher, of blessed memory, by the command of the Holy One, Blessed be He, ordained Joshua and the seventy elders, and they ordained others, and others ordained others. It turns out that all those ordained are as if they were ordained by Moses our teacher from the mouth of the Almighty. And due to our sins, from the greatness of the dispersion that we have been scattered to the four corners of the earth, ordination has ceased, and our status is as laymen. Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, said that if, Heaven forbid, judges were to cease from Israel who have the power to compel judgment, there would be a "locking of the door" before borrowers, and commerce and trust would cease, and robbers would multiply. Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, said that even in this time, we perform the mission of the former ones to appoint judges and to judge in legal matters. And because this is only for the sake of the repair of the world, we only perform their mission in a common matter and where there is a monetary loss. But in a matter where there is no monetary loss, even if it is common, such as double-payment and other fines, and likewise a matter that is not common even if there is a monetary loss, such as an animal that injured a person or that gored another animal with its horns and killed it and the like, we do not judge in this time. And there are matters that do not pertain to money that we also judge in this time, and even though they require ordained judges, we perform their mission because the matter is very great, such as the acceptance of converts [in a place where there is government permission], for in order to bring a soul under the wings of the Shekhinah and so as not to lock the door before one who desires, we attend to this even in this time [Tosafot Yevamot 47a and the Ran at the end of Gittin]. And likewise we attend to compelling a divorce in a place where according to the law of the Torah we compel a divorce [with the permission of the government] for the sake of the benefit of the daughters of Israel. And that which we said, that ordained judges are required in monetary laws from the Torah, this is specifically when judging by means of compulsion, but with the consent of the litigants, ordained judges are not required at all.

Therefore, in this time, we adjudicate through coercion the laws of admissions and loans; that is, when one sues his fellow with witnesses of admission who testify that he admitted to him in their presence with a complete admission that he owes him a maneh, according to the laws that will be explained in siman 81, or with witnesses of a loan who testify that he borrowed in their presence. And the laws of inheritances and gifts, and the laws of women's ketubot, and the laws of partnership and agency, and all types of commerce, for all of these are common and involve a monetary loss. And even though in a gift there is no monetary loss, nevertheless it is considered like a monetary loss, for regarding most gifts, if the giver did not have some benefit from the recipient, he would not have given him a gift. And likewise, one who damages the property of his fellow, and the hiring of workers, and those similar to them which are common and involve a monetary loss, we adjudicate in this time.

A person who injured his fellow, we do not collect nezek, tza'ar, pegam, or boshet, for there is no loss of money in this. And even though in nezek there is a loss of money, nevertheless, such an injury that would cause him permanent damage through the loss of a limb is not common. Regarding this, our sages, of blessed memory, said [Bava Kamma 84b] that regarding a person [who injured] a person, we do not collect it in Bavel because it is not common. And behold, we see that strikes and humiliations are common, but to cause permanent damage is not common. This is the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory [Chapter 5 of Sanhedrin], and therefore he wrote that rippuy and shevet are collected in Bavel because there is a loss of money in this. However, regarding tza'ar and boshet, and similarly in a case where there is pegam, such as with one who rapes or seduces, there is no loss of money in this. [And so wrote the Maharik in root 1, that according to the Rambam it refers to nezek alone; and so it appears there from that which he said, "anything that is appraised as a slave etc., Rava follows his own reasoning," and the difficulty of the Lechem Mishneh is not a difficulty at all, and ordinary injuries are common; and so wrote the Tumim, and examine this closely.] And there are some of our teachers who hold that even shevet and rippuy are not collected, for they hold that what our sages, of blessed memory, said—that damages of a person to a person are not collected in Bavel—refers to all five matters. This is the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur. Nevertheless, even according to this opinion, we compel the injurer to appease the injured party according to the value that appears appropriate to the judges; so wrote our teacher, the Rema. Similarly, an animal that injured a person, we do not judge because it is not common. But a person who injured the animal of his fellow pays full nezek in every place, and we judge this because it is common. Similarly, an animal that caused damage with shen or regel, we judge in every place for this is common. But when it caused damage with keren, we do not judge, for this is not common. Similarly, an animal that killed a person, the beit din does not compel him to pay kofer, for this is not common. Similarly, regarding damages of fire and damages of a pit, some say we do not judge because they are not common [Shach], and some say we do judge because it is common occasionally [Shevut Yaakov]. Several of the great later authorities agreed with this opinion, and so appears to be the primary law, for so it is implied in the Rambam, chapter 14 of Nizkei Mamon, law 12, and it will be explained in siman 418. And the law of kofer and keren, even though we do not judge in this time, nevertheless we compel the owner of the ox to remove the damage-causer, as will be explained in siman 409, for everyone is obligated to remove from his domain a thing that damages others, as I wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 334.

The laws of robberies and thefts are adjudicated in this time regarding the collection of the principal alone, and not regarding double payment or fourfold and fivefold payments, because this is a fine, and we do not adjudicate laws of fines in this time. And similarly, all fines that the sages penalized, such as one who blasts into his fellow's ear or slaps him on the cheek and the like, we do not adjudicate. And even though there are those who say that we do not adjudicate all types of robberies in this time, nevertheless, the decision of the great later authorities is that in this time, when there are no ordained judges at all, we adjudicate all types of robberies, for if not so, the land would be filled with violence; and such is the primary ruling.

Laws of garmi, such as one who burns the notes of his fellow and the like, which will be explained in siman 386, and likewise the laws of an informer, which will be explained in siman 388, are adjudicated even in this time. And likewise, witnesses who testified and their testimony was found to be a lie, such as when they were rendered zomemim by other witnesses according to the law of hazamah which will be explained in siman 38, if money was extracted based on the testimony of the first witnesses and it is impossible to return the money to its owner, we judge the witnesses and obligate them to pay. And specifically when they were rendered zomemim, but if they were only contradicted by a contradiction regarding the essence of the act and not by hazamah of "you were with us," we do not obligate them to pay, for from where do we know that the first witnesses testified falsely? Perhaps the contradictors testified falsely. For specifically in hazamah did the Torah believe the refuters, and it is a novelty that the Torah innovated regarding hazamah and not regarding contradiction, and there the reasons for this will be explained with the help of Heaven. And even in hazamah, if they did not extract money based on the first witnesses, but only that the first witnesses exempted the defendant from an oath—even though through this they caused a loss to the plaintiff, for had he been required to swear he would have paid and would not have sworn falsely—nevertheless they are exempt from paying, for this is only gerama [Shevut Yaakov]. And likewise, if they had not yet extracted money based on them, but only that the verdict was finalized and they were rendered zomemim, even though this is the essence of hazamah as is written there, nevertheless we do not judge this in this time because there is no monetary loss in this.

The Geonim enacted that even though we do not judge cases of kenasot in this time, nevertheless, we place him under a niddui until he appeases his litigant. When the beit din sees that he gives to him according to their discretion, even if it is not according to the law of the kenas, they release his niddui, whether his litigant was appeased or was not appeased. And if the damager died, they do not place his heir under a niddui after him, for the essence of the enactment was so that men of violence should not increase in the world; therefore, it is sufficient if they penalized him alone and not his heir [Urim VeTummim and Netivot HaMishpat].

If the injured party seized the money of the damager or his objects, we do not remove from his hand what he seized up to the full amount of the kenas. And if he seized more, beit din commands him to return the remainder. And even regarding double payment or four-fold and five-fold payment, seizure is effective, since in truth he is liable according to the Torah, except that we do not have the power to adjudicate. Therefore, when he seized on his own, he seized his own. Only in a case where one claims the plea of a thief regarding a deposit and swore and it was found that he himself stole it, he is not liable by law in this time for double payment and seizure is not effective [Shach], for the oath must be before an ordained beit din, which we do not have now [Netivot HaMishpat]. And similarly regarding an innocuous ox that caused damage, some say that seizure is not effective unless he seized the ox itself, for an innocuous ox only pays from its own body. And similarly, it is forbidden to seize through a star-worshiper. And if the injured party says to beit din, "Appraise my damages for me so that I may know how much to seize," we do not listen to him, for this is like adjudicating laws of kenasot. But that which they command him to return the remainder is not like adjudicating, since he already seized, and of necessity beit din must tell him not to take more than what the Torah obligated. And furthermore, after his seizure, it becomes like his actual property, as will be explained in section 9.

When the injured party seized [property] and the damager denies it entirely and says that he did not damage him at all, if witnesses did not see what he now holds in his hand, or if there are no witnesses to his seizure even if they see it now in his hand, the injured party is believed with an oath that he damaged him, because he has a migo of "I returned it to you" when they did not see it now in his hand, or with a migo of "the matter never occurred" when there are no witnesses to his seizure, for he could say "it is purchased in my hand," as will be explained in siman 133. But if witnesses saw the object now in his hand and there are also witnesses to his seizure, he is not believed and must bring proof that he damaged him; and if he did not bring proof, they compel him to return the object or the money he seized. And regarding orphans, seizure does not avail for knasot when the liable party died [Netivot HaMishpat], for by law the movable property of orphans is not encumbered to a creditor, but the Geonim enacted that they should be encumbered as written in siman 107, and regarding knasot, the Geonim certainly did not enact.

When the injured party seized the amount of the knas and the damager went back and seized it from him, there is one who says that we do not extract it from the hand of the damager [Netivot HaMishpat], for if the beit din were to attend to extracting it from the damager, they would be adjudicating laws of knas. And there is one who says that we do extract it from the hand of the damager [Rabbi Akiva Eiger], because when the injured party seized it, it became his actual property and the status of knas was removed from this, and such is the primary view.

By Torah law, one who confesses to a fine is exempt, but the confession must be before an ordained beit din, which we do not have in this time. Therefore, his confession is not effective to exempt him in this time if the injured party seizes [the amount of the fine]. However, there is a distinction: if he confessed when there were witnesses at the time of the damage, he is liable, and his confession is not effective to exempt him if the injured party seizes [the fine]. But if there were no witnesses at all at the time of the damage, he is exempt, and the seizure [by the injured party] is not effective [Netivot HaMishpat], for without witnesses there is no liability for a fine. One who confesses to a fine and afterwards witnesses come was explained in siman 348, section 9; see there.

That which we have explained, that we do not judge cases of kenasot in this time, this is not a general rule for all kenasot; for if the kenas pertains to the strengthening of the religion of our holy Torah, we judge it even in this time, and it will be explained in siman 2 [this is the intention of the Rema, section 5, and the difficulty of the Tosafot is resolved]:

One who shames with words, they place him under a ban until he appeases him properly according to the honor of the one shamed. And how much more so if he shamed a talmid chacham; even though we do not judge now with a litra of gold, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 243, nevertheless, they must demand the honor of the Torah. And if they do not demand its honor, the Torah will be disgraced, Heaven forbid. See in siman 420 [Urim VeTummim].

Even though we do not judge cases of fines in this time, nevertheless, one who causes damage should be concerned for himself to fulfill his obligation toward Heaven and to fulfill all payments of fines that the Torah obligated, and which our holy teachers, the masters of the Mishnah, the Gemara, and the Geonim, obligated. And if the litigants accepted upon themselves judges who would judge the law of the fine for them, the acceptance is effective, just as with the acceptance of a relative or one who is disqualified, which will be explained in siman 22. And in a case where they cannot retract there, they also cannot retract here. And even though there is one who is uncertain about this, nevertheless, it appears to me that this is the primary ruling, and a judge who is not ordained is no worse than a relative or one who is disqualified [see in the Ketzot HaChoshen].

That which we have said, that there is no semikhah in this time, do not find it difficult, for is it not the case that the semikhah of the rabbinate is still practiced, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 242? For this semikhah is only an enactment of our teachers as a remembrance of semikhah, and it is nothing other than the receiving of permission, as is written there. And this is for gittin, kiddushin, and chalitzot, for one should not attend to these matters without the practiced semikhah.

How was the procedure of the judges during the time of the Temple? The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in the first chapter of Hilkhot Sanhedrin that initially they establish the Great Beit Din in the Temple, and it is called the Great Sanhedrin, and their number is seventy-one, as it is said: "Gather for Me seventy men from the elders of Israel," and Moshe is over them, as it is said: "and they shall stand there with you." The greatest in wisdom among them all is seated as the head over them, and he is the head of the Yeshiva, and he is the one whom the sages call everywhere the Nasi, and he is the one who stands in the place of Moshe our teacher. And they seat the greatest of the seventy as second to the head, and he sits to his right, and he is the one called the Av Beit Din. And the rest of the seventy sit before him according to their years and according to their stature; whoever is greater than his fellow in wisdom shall be closer to the Nasi from his left than his fellow. And they sit in the form of a half-threshing floor in a circle, so that the Nasi and the Av Beit Din see them all. And they further establish two batei dinin of twenty-three, twenty-three; one at the entrance of the Courtyard and one at the entrance of the Temple Mount. And they establish in every single city of Israel that has one hundred and twenty or more a Small Sanhedrin, and it sits at the gate of the city, as it is said: "and establish justice in the gate." And how many shall their number be? Twenty-three judges. And the greatest in wisdom among them all is the head over them, and the rest sit in a circle like a half-threshing floor so that the head sees them all. And a city that does not have one hundred and twenty men, they establish three judges, for a beit din is not less than three, so that there may be a majority and a minority among them if there is a dispute between them regarding one of the laws. Thus far his words. And there are those who say that the Sanhedrin would sit to the right and to the left of the Nasi [Hagahot Maimoniyot], and so it stands to reason, for in this manner it is easier for there to be a half-threshing floor in a circle. And so it is found in the Yerushalmi, the first chapter of Sanhedrin, that the Nasi sat in the middle. And it is possible that the Rambam also holds this, and that which he wrote, that whoever is greater than his fellow is closer to the Nasi from his left, means that from his right the closeness is to the Av Beit Din, since he sits to the right of the Nasi. And that which he wrote, that whoever is greater than his fellow in wisdom sits closer to the Nasi, that is when they are equal in years; but the one who is greater in years sits closer than the one who is greater in wisdom [Kesef Mishneh]. And even though in Yoreh Deah siman 244 it was explained that in a gathering of Torah they give wisdom more status than old age, it appears to me that in the Sanhedrin it is different, for behold, all of them are distinguished in wisdom, and the greatness of one over his fellow is not by a vast margin; therefore, they give the status to old age, since the second one is also distinguished in wisdom [and it is difficult to say that the Rambam rules like Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok in the Yerushalmi and Tosafot that our teacher the Maran brought in Kesef Mishneh, and furthermore there it was only for the sake of honor and Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok does not disagree according to the version of the Yerushalmi, see there and examine carefully].

The great beit din in Jerusalem is over all of Israel, and the beit din in each and every city is over that city. Furthermore, there was a beit din of twenty-three for each and every tribe, and thus our sages, of blessed memory, expounded: From where do we know to appoint judges for every tribe? The verse states, "judges... for your tribes." From where do we know to appoint judges for every city? The verse states, "judges... in all your gates" [Sanhedrin 16b]. And the beit din of the tribe was composed of those most distinguished in wisdom from the entire tribe, and it was to all the cities of the tribe like the great beit din in Jerusalem. One of the litigants of that tribe may summon the other to the beit din of the tribe even though they dwell in another city [Ramban, Parshat Shoftim]. Furthermore, our sages, of blessed memory, said that in Eretz Yisrael they establish a beit din in each and every city and in each and every pelekh [end of the first chapter of Makkot]. And a pelekh is a province to which many cities belong. And it appears to me that this and that are one and the same: for during the time of the First Temple, when each and every tribe dwelt in its own cities and the tribes were not mixed with one another, there was a specific beit din over each tribe individually, and then there was no beit din in every pelekh, for the location of the tribal beit din is the pelekh. However, in the Second Temple, when the tribes were mixed with one another and it was not possible to establish a beit din for each and every tribe, they established a specific beit din in each and every pelekh in place of the tribal beit din, and all the cities surrounding the pelekh were subordinate to the beit din of the pelekh just as to the tribal beit din during the First Temple. And it appears that this is the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, who wrote there that it is a positive commandment of the Torah to appoint judges and officers in each and every province and in each and every pelekh, and he did not mention a beit din for every tribe, yet in chapter 5 he mentioned them; learn from this that he holds as I have written [and all that they questioned him on is well-settled; and see Lechem Mishneh. And the Rambam calls a city a "medina," as he wrote in the Commentary on the Mishnah, chapter 4 of Rosh Hashanah. And Tosafot wrote in Sanhedrin 16b that if there are members of two tribes in one city, they require two batei din; see there].

Every beit din had specific shotrim who were subject to the authority of the beit din to compel the fulfillment of what the beit din commanded, as it is said: "Judges and shotrim you shall appoint for yourself," etc. They were also appointed over prices and to guard the measures and the weights and other matters pertaining to the Israelite religion. In their hand was a staff and a strap to strike any who refused and any who perverted his ways. There is no set number for the shotrim, for this is according to the sight of the eyes of the dayanim according to the need. Our sages of blessed memory expounded on the verse "which you shall set before them"—these are the tools of the dayanim. When Rav Huna would go out to judgment, he would say: "Bring out for me the tools of my trade: a staff, a strap, and a shofar," etc. [Sanhedrin 7b]. The Tur wrote in the name of Rav Hai Gaon that a beit din must have ready at the seat of the beit din a staff to chastise with, a strap to lash with, and a shofar, etc., and a Sefer Torah also must be ready in the beit din. Thus far his words. Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, omitted this. In truth, it is implied clearly from the Rambam that this pertains to the shotrim, and this law applies only during the time of the Temple, for now we do not have shotrim. Rav Huna perhaps was the Resh Galuta and had authority for this from the monarchy, which is not the case now; therefore they omitted it in the Shulchan Aruch [so it appears to me in my humble opinion; and the Urim VeTumim wondered why the Rambam, of blessed memory, omitted it, but in truth he did not omit it and wrote it regarding the shotrim, and examine this carefully].

The Sages, of blessed memory, said that all this applies in Eretz Yisrael, but in Chutz La'aretz, even in Jewish cities and during the time of the Temple, there is no obligation to seat dayanim in every single city, but rather in every single district [Makkot ibid.]. And it appears to me that this refers to a beit din of twenty-three, but a beit din of three is certainly required, for it is impossible to say that for every single judgment they would need to go to the district. However, from the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory, there, it is clear that his version of the text was that in every district it is not required, but in every single city it is required [see there in Halacha 2, and in Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh; and according to what I wrote, this version appears correct, and examine this carefully].

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote [ibid.]: Any city that does not have two great sages, one worthy of teaching and ruling in the entire Torah and one who knows how to listen and knows how to ask and answer, a Sanhedrin is not established there even if it contains thousands of Israel. A Sanhedrin that has these two, one worthy of listening and one worthy of speaking, this is a Sanhedrin. If there were three, this is an average one. If there were four who know how to speak, this is a Sanhedrin of wisdom. Thus far his words. And some say that any city that does not have two to speak in seventy languages and one to listen and understand them, even though he cannot speak, a Sanhedrin is not established there. And if there are three speaking in seventy languages, there is none superior to it [Rashi ibid. 17b]. And according to this opinion, it is explicitly implied in Yerushalmi Shekalim chapter 5. According to this, the places that had a Sanhedri Ketannah were few; however, certainly a beit din of three is required in every place.

Every small sanhedrin seats before them three rows of Torah scholars, in each and every row twenty-three men. The first row is close to the sanhedrin, the second row is below it, and the third is below that. In each and every row they sit according to their excellence in wisdom. If the sanhedrin was divided and they needed to add one to their number and ordain him, they ordain from the first row the greatest among them. Then the first in the second row comes and sits at the end of the first row, for the smallest in the first is greater than the greatest in the second [Rashi]. Then the first in the third comes and sits at the end of the second row, for the smallest in the second is greater than the greatest in the third. They choose one from the rest of the congregation to fill the deficiency in the third row and seat him at the end of the row, because the least of the students is greater than the greatest in the congregation [ibid.]. They say to him: "Be a tail to lions and do not be a head to foxes." And so if they needed to ordain two or three, they act according to this order. And so if one of them died, they all shift from their places until the last in the third row is missing, and they fill it from the congregation. And every place where there is a sanhedrin, there shall be two scribes of the judges standing before them, one on the right and one on the left. This one on the right writes the words of those who acquit, and this one on the left writes the words of those who convict. And some say that both of them write the words of those who acquit and the words of those who convict, so that if one errs, the writing of his fellow will prove it [Rashi 36b]. And in the Gemara [ibid. 34a] it implies that this was only in capital cases.

Our sages, of blessed memory, said [ibid. 88b]: Initially, they did not increase dispute in Israel; rather, a beit din of seventy-one sat in the Lishkat HaGazit, and two batei din of twenty-three sat, one at the entrance of the Azarah and one at the entrance of the Har HaBayit, and the remaining batei din of twenty-three sat in all the cities of Israel. If a matter required asking, the inquirer asked of the beit din in his city; if they had heard [the tradition], they told them, and if not, they came to that which was near the city [it appears to me that this is the beit din of the tribe or the district]. If they had heard, they told them, and if not, they came to that which was at the entrance of the Har HaBayit; if they had heard, they told them, and if not, they came to that which was at the entrance of the Azarah. If they had heard, they told them, and if not, these and those came to the Lishkat HaGazit, for there they sat from the morning Tamid until the afternoon Tamid, and on Shabbatot and Yamim Tovim they sat in the Cheil, which was the beit midrash on the Har HaBayit. The question was asked before them: if they had heard, they told them, and if not, they stood for a vote; if those who rule "impure" were the majority, they ruled it impure, if those who rule "pure" were the majority, they ruled it pure, etc. And from there they wrote to all the cities of Israel. And they examined anyone whom they found to be wise, sin-fearing, humble, of sound mind, whose conduct was pleasant, and with whom the spirit of people was pleased, they made him a dayan in his city, and from there they elevated him to the entrance of the Har HaBayit, and from there they elevated him to the entrance of the Azarah, and from there they elevated him to the Great beit din.

And why is there no sanhedrin except in a city that has one hundred and twenty residents? In order that there shall be from them a sanhedrin of twenty-three, and three rows of twenty-three, and ten batlanim of the beit knesset who shall be free from labor and sustained by the community so that they are always found in the beit knesset, and two scribes, and two chazzanim—and these are the attendants of the beit din to lash the liable and to summon the litigants to judgment—and two litigants, and two witnesses, and two zomemim so that the witnesses will be afraid to testify falsely lest they be refuted, and two zomemim of zomemim, for perhaps the litigant will be found liable and will hire witnesses to refute them; therefore there must be another two people so that they will be afraid of them, that they will not refute them [Rashi 17b]. And even though, aside from the beit din that judges them, all are fit for testimony, nevertheless they will not be as afraid of all those who serve in the sanctuary as they are afraid of other people [it appears to me]. This totals one hundred and fourteen. And two gabbei tzedakah and one more so that there will be three for the distribution of tzedakah, for tzedakah is collected by two and distributed by three, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 256, and a skilled physician, and a scribe, and a teacher of children; this totals one hundred and twenty. And it appears to me that these one hundred and twenty must be adults in years, not less than twenty years of age, and within the number of judges, which is ninety-two, there shall not be an exceedingly old man, nor a saris, nor one who has no children, for all of these are not fit for the sanhedrin, as will be explained.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in the second chapter of Sanhedrin: We only appoint to the Sanhedrin, whether the Great or the Small, men who are wise and understanding, and distinguished in the wisdom of the Torah, possessing great intellect, knowing something of other wisdoms such as medicine, mathematics, seasons, constellations, astrology, and the ways of soothsayers, diviners, sorcerers, and the vanities of idolaters and the like, so that they will know how to judge them. Thus far his words. And even though he wrote previously that it is sufficient for one to be fit to teach and instruct in the entire Torah and one who knows how to listen, as has been explained in section 19, this is regarding instructing in the entire Torah; however, all of them must be distinguished in the wisdom of the Torah, even if they do not know how to instruct in the entire Torah [and the words of the Lechem Mishneh require further study; and see Tosafot Menachot 65a, s.v. "Viyode'im," and in truth, this is why the Rambam explained that it refers to the entire Torah; and delve into this].

The Rambam, of blessed memory, further wrote: Just as a beit din is cleansed in righteousness, so must they be cleansed of all physical blemishes, and one must strive and examine and search so that they are all of advanced age, of stature, of appearance, understanding whispers, and that they know most languages so that the Sanhedrin does not hear from the mouth of an interpreter. Thus far his words. It appears from his words that what was explained in this section is not indispensable, and therefore he wrote that they should only strive to obtain such men, whereas what was in the previous section is indispensable. And even though in the Shas [Menachot ibid.] they were stated as one, nevertheless it stands to reason to him that these matters are not indispensable, as they are only to instill awe [Lechem Mishneh]. Furthermore, the knowledge of most languages is also rare to find, and if we say that this is indispensable, we would never find a Sanhedrin; and behold, in the Shas it implies that Mordechai was unique in this. A beit din of three does not require all of these things, but only that they possess seven traits: wisdom, humility, fear of sin, hatred of money, love of truth, love of people toward them, and being of good name, and it will be explained in siman 7. And certainly a Sanhedrin must possess all of these traits. And that which the Rambam wrote, that they should know most languages, even though in the Shas it says seventy languages, he holds that the intent is the languages prevalent in the countries then [see in Lechem Mishneh].

One may only appoint to the Sanhedrin Kohanim, Levites, and Israelites of distinguished lineage who are fit to marry into the priesthood; that is, their daughters are permitted to a Kohen. But those whose daughters are forbidden to a Kohen, according to what I wrote in Even HaEzer siman 6 and 7, are forbidden from sitting on the Sanhedrin and judging capital cases. And even though for monetary cases only those who will be explained in siman 7 are disqualified, nevertheless, it is impossible to sit on the Sanhedrin for monetary cases alone; anyone who sits on the Sanhedrin must be fit to judge capital cases, and if not, he is forbidden from sitting at all, and shall sit in a beit din of three [and with this, what the Rambam changed in chapter 2, halacha 1 from the language of the Mishnah in the chapter "One Who Brings a Get" is understood; and examine this closely]. For just as they must be clean in righteousness, so must they be clean of all family blemishes. Our sages, of blessed memory, learned this from the verses "and they shall stand there with you" and "and they shall bear with you," that they should be similar to you in wisdom, fear, and lineage. And even though it is impossible to be like Moses our teacher, nevertheless, regarding the negation of wisdom, fear, and lineage, they must be equal to him. And in the Great Sanhedrin, it is a mitzvah to seek out Kohanim and Levites, as it is said, "And you shall come to the Kohanim, the Levites." And if they did not find among them those fit for this, even if they were all Israelites of distinguished lineage, it is permitted. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, expounded in the Sifrei: I might think it is a requirement, and if there are none it is disqualified; therefore the verse says, "and to the judge," even if there are no Kohanim and Levites in it, it is valid. And in a Small Sanhedrin, one does not seek them out even ab initio, for this verse was stated regarding the Great beit din.

One does not seat a king on the Sanhedrin because it is forbidden to disagree with him or to defy his word, for anyone who defies the word of a king is a rebel against the monarchy and is liable for death; and if so, if the king expresses his opinion, there is no longer deliberation in the judgment. However, a Kohen Gadol is seated on the Sanhedrin if he is fit for it. And the kings of the House of David, even though one does not seat them on the Sanhedrin, nevertheless, they sit and judge the people, as it is written: "House of David, thus says Hashem: Execute justice in the morning." And likewise, one judges them if they have a legal case, for if not so, they too would not have the ability to judge, as anyone who is not judged does not judge. And specifically regarding dinei mamonot one judges, but regarding dinei nefashot one does not judge, except if it was for his honor, such as if one spoke against him, for then the king judges him even to death, as a rebel against the monarchy shall be killed, like King David who judged Naval [Tosafot Sanhedrin 19a]. And a rebel against the monarchy does not require judging like other dinei nefashot, which one does not judge at night and the like; rather, since he rebelled against the monarchy, they kill him [Megillah 14b]. And the kings of Israel neither judge nor are judged, lest a mishap arise from this. And in the Yerushalmi it is brought that a king is not judged by human beings, but by the Holy One, Blessed be He, alone, as it is said: "Let my judgment come forth from before You." And one does not appoint to any type of Sanhedrin an elder of advanced years, only those of old age but not advanced in old age. And the reason is because he has already forgotten the pain of raising children and is not merciful [Rashi 36b]. Nor a eunuch, because there is cruelty in him. Nor one who has no children, even if he had them and they died [so it appears to me, for if not so, it would be the same thing; and see Rashi Horayot 4b, s.v. "ei zaken," and it requires great study].